ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This
influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action; and yet, he says, it is absurd
and a contradiction, to say they are causes.
4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives as disposing the Agent to action,
by their influence. His words are these: “As Motive, which takes place in the understanding,
and is the product of intelligence, is necessary to action, that is, to the exertion of the active
faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some previous reason to dispose
the mind to action; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be disposed
to one action rather than another, this properly signifies the prevailing influence that one
Motive has upon a man for the production of an action, or for the being at rest, before all
other Motives, for the production of the contrary. For as motive is the ground and reason
of any action, so the Motive that prevails, disposes the agent to the performance of that ac-
tion.”
Now, if motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be disposed;
and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing
is to cause it to will; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And
yet this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act of
the Will.
And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconsist-
ences. Motives are the previous ground and reason of the acts of the Will; yea, the necessary
ground and reason of their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in
the nature of things, take place; and they do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by a
prevailing influence; yea, an influence which prevails for the production of the act of the Will,
and for the disposing of the mind to it; and yet it is absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause
of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved or caused to be exerted by it, or that
it has any causality in the production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of
the Will.
A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange incon-
sistences which his notion of Liberty—consisting in the Will’s power of self-determination
void of all necessity, united with that dictate of common sense, that there can be no volition
without a Motive—drove him into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly im-
possible ever to make that notion of Liberty consistent with the influence of Motives in vo-
lition. And as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, or preference
of the mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in the mind’s view which it
aims at, and goes after; so it is most manifest, that there is no such Liberty in the universe
as Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible, or conceivable.
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…