But let us leave this, and along
with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words; and let us go on
to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But I think it would perhaps
be well to pass without examination over most of these subsequent
words. For in all of them he shows himself the same, not grappling with
that which we have really said, but only inventing for himself points
for refutation which he pretends are taken from our statement. To go
carefully through these would be pronounced useless by any one
possessed of
judgment; for any understanding reader of his book can from his very
words perceive his scurrility. He says that God’s Glory is prior
to our leader’s “conception.” We too do not deny
that. For God’s glory, whatever we are to think of it, is prior
not only to this present generation of ours, but to all creation; it
transcends the ages. What, then, is gained for his argument from this
fact, that God’s glory is conceded to be superior not only to
Basil, but to all the ages? “Yes, but this name is His
glory,” he says. But pray tell us, in order that we may assent to
this statement, who has proved that the appellation is identical with
the glory? “A law of our nature,” he replies,
“teaches us that, in naming realities, the dignity of the names
does not depend on the will of those who give them.” What is this
law of nature? And how is it that it is not in force amongst all? If
nature had really enacted such a law, it ought to have authority
amongst all who share the common nature, just as the other things
peculiar to that nature have. If, in fine, it was the law of nature
that caused the appellations to spring up for us from the objects, just
as her plants spring up from seeds and roots, and she did not entrust
the significant naming of each of the subjects to the choice of those
who had to indicate the objects, then all mankind would be of one
tongue. For if the names imposed upon these objects did not vary, we
should not differ from one another in the department of speech. He says
it is “a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs
of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon realities from
a source above us.” How is it, then, that the Prophets were
ignorant of this holy thing, and were not instructed in this design of
Providence, who according to your account did not make God at all of
this Ungeneracy? How, too, is it that the Deity Himself never knew of
this kind of holiness, when He did not give names from above to the
animals which He had formed, but gave away this power of name-giving to
Adam? If it is closely connected with the designs of Providence, as
Eunomius says, and a holy thing, that their sounds should be imposed
from above upon realities, it is certainly an unholy thing, and an
unfitting thing, that these names should have been fitted to the things
that are by any here below. “But the universal Guardian,”
he says, “thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by
a law of His creation.” And how was it, then, if these were
engrafted in the minds of men, that from Adam onward to your
transgression no fruits of this folly were produced, grafted as they
were, according to you, in those minds, so that ungeneracy should be
the name of the Father’s essence? Adam and all in succession
after him would have pronounced this word, if such had been grafted by
God in his nature. For as all that now grows upon the earth continues
always, owing to a transmission of its seed from the first creation,
and not one single seed at the present time innovates upon the natural
form, so this word, if it had been, as you say, grafted by God in our
nature, would have sprung up along with the first utterances of the
first-formed human beings, and would have accompanied the line of their
posterity. But seeing that this word did not exist at the first (for no
one in former generations and up to the present ever uttered such a
word, except this man), it is plain that it is a bastard invention,
that has sprung up from the seed of tares, not from that good seed
which God has sown, to use evangelic words, in the field of our nature.
For all the things that characterize our common nature do not have
their beginning now, but appeared with that nature at its first
formation; such, for instance, as the operation of the senses, the
appetitive, or contrary, instinct of the man with regard to anything,
and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his nature, none of
which a particular epoch has introduced amongst those born in it; but
our humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the
same circle of qualities, losing none which it had at the beginning,
any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as, while
sight is a faculty common to our nature, scientific observation comes
by training to those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is
not every one, for instance, who can observe with the theodolite, or
prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do anything else,
where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight),
so too, while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a
common property of humanity united to the very essence of our nature
from above, the invention of terms significative of realities is the
work of men who, possessing from above the power of reason, are
continually finding out, according as they wish for them towards the
elucidation of that which they plainly see, certain words expressive of
these things. “But if these views are to prevail,” says he,
“one of two things is proved; either that conception is anterior
to those who conceive, or that the names naturally befitting the Deity,
and pre-existent to everything, are posterior to the beginning of
man.” Ought we to continue the fight against such assertions, and
join issue with such manifest absurdity?