“Son-Fathers1073,” all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from
their account. But if they say that there is nothing to hinder the distinction between generated
and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that term represents the
essence too, let them distinguish for us the kindred meanings of the word, so that the notion
of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of
the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal
opposition. For as an equivalent to saying “The Son has, and the Father has not, been gen-
erated,” we too assent to the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated,
by a sort of verbal correlation. But from what point of view a clear manifestation of essence
can be made by this appellation, this they are unable to say. But keeping silence on this head,
our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his former treatise. Because
God, saith he, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What has
the notion of simplicity to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten
generated, but, without controversy, He is simple also. But, saith he, He is without parts
also, and incomposite. But what is this to the point? For neither is the Son multiform and
composite: and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.
But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is
unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But this is not the point. For
the task set before us is this: in what signification of ungenerate is essence declared? For as
this word marks the difference of the properties, so they maintain that the essence also is
indicated without ambiguity by one of the things signified by the appellation.
But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated
of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he, is dissolved, and passes away
with its utterance. But what is there that is uttered but is so dissolved? For we do not keep
undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we utter with our voice in the mould
of the speech which we form once for all with our lips, but as soon as one speech has been
sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For the breath of our voice being
dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the spot in which such
dispersion of our voice has taken place: so that if he makes this the distinguishing character-
istic of a term that expresses a mere conception, that it does not remain, but vanishes with
the voice that gives it utterance, he may as well at once call every term a mere conception,
inasmuch as no substance remains in any term subsequent to its utterance. No, nor will he
be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he excepts from the products of conception,
is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this expression of the voice through
1073 i.e.who hold the Father and the Son to be one and the same Person, i.e. Sabellians. “He here overthrows
the heresy of Sabellius, by marking the persons of the Father and the Son: for the Church does not imagine a
Son-Fatherhood (υἰοπατορίαν), such as the figment of that African” (Ammonius caten. ad Joh. I. i. p. 14).
484
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.