fitness, that he whose heart sincerely unites itself to Christ as his Saviour, should be looked
upon as united to that Saviour, and so having an interest in him; and not from any moral
fitness there is between the excellency of such a qualification as faith, and such a glorious
blessedness as the having an interest in Christ. God’s bestowing Christ and his benefits on
a soul in consequence of faith, out of regard only to the natural concord there is between
such a qualification of a soul, and such an union with Christ, and interest in him, makes
the case very widely different from what it would be, if he bestowed this from regard to any
moral suitableness. For, in the former case, it is only from God’s love of order that he bestows
these things on the account of faith; in the latter, God doth it out of love to the grace of faith
itself. God will neither look on Christ’s merits as ours, nor adjudge his benefits to us, till we
be in Christ; nor will he look upon us as being in him, without an active unition of our hearts
and souls to him; because he is a wise being, and delights in order, and not in confusion,
and that things should be together or asunder according to their nature; and his making
such a constitution is a testimony of his love of order. 487 Whereas if it were out of regard
to any moral fitness or suitableness between faith and such blessedness, it would be a testi-
mony of his love to the act or qualification itself. The one supposes this divine constitution
to be a manifestation of God’s regard to the beauty of the act of faith; the other only supposes
it to be a manifestation of his regard to the beauty of that order that there is in uniting those
things that have a natural agreement, and congruity, and unition of the one with the other.
Indeed a moral suitableness or fitness to a state includes a natural; for, if there be a moral
suitableness that a person should be in such a state, there is also a natural suitableness; but
such a natural suitableness as I have described, by no means necessarily includes a moral.
This is plainly what our divines intend when they say, that faith does not justify as a
work, or a righteousness, viz. that it does not justify as a part of our moral goodness or ex-
cellency, or that it does not justify as man was to have been justified by the covenant of
works, which was, to have a title to eternal life given to him of God, in testimony of his
pleasedness with his works, or his regard to the inherent excellency and beauty of his
obedience. And this is certainly what the apostle Paul means, when he so much insists upon
it, that we are not justified by works, viz. that we are not justified by them as good works,
487 This order, however, is a law to us, and compliance with it necessarily imports moral obedience; though
the object received is the obedience of another. No one has room to expect success in his endeavors, but by
complying with the divine requisition; and that requisition is, that we submit to the perfection of Messiah. And
an act of submission to the righteousness of faith may well be an act of moral excellence, though that excellence
has nothing meritorious on account of which a perfect righteousness should be imputed. A thing may have
moral goodness without moral perfection. But in order to deny to faith the latter, it is not necessary to deprive
it of the former. If we consistently maintain, that the moral excellence of faith constitutes no part of our justifying
righteousness, it is all that the argument requires, in order to establish the conclusion intended.—W
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DISCOURSE. II. Pressing into the Kingdom of God.