about. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would
be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person’s enjoyment of very high
degrees of pleasure.
Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence,
or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of an-
other, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes
beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, desiring no positive
good for him, but evil; and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And
when he sees the person whom he thus hates in misery far beyond his ill will, he may then
pity him: because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not
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overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than
it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others
under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their
prosperity. And some have such a grudge against another, that they would be far from uneasy
at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case, it is manifest
that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of
malevolence. Yet at the same time, they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if
they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill will.
These things may convince us, that natural pity is of a nature very different from true
virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence; but is owing to
a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted, chiefly for the preservation of man-
kind, though not exclusive of their well being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God’s
mercy, and an instance of his love to the world of mankind, and an evidence, that though
the world be so sinful, it is not God’s design to make it a world of punishment; and therefore
has many ways made a merciful provision of relief in extreme calamities. The natural exercises
of pity extend beyond those with whom we are nearly connected, especially in cases of great
calamity; because, commonly in such cases, men stand in need of the help of others besides
their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief,
tend to their destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the Author
of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others’ great
prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz. because they do not
stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure
benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate to as great a degree
in congratulation, in cases of others’ great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in
great misery.
The instincts which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to
the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation and
comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment—where the state of the wicked
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CHAPTER VI. Of particular instincts of nature