as one whole, in the disposition and action of the head: as we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected
as the head is affected; and the whole body concurs when the head acts. Now, in this case, all the branches of
mankind, by the constitution of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as Adam, their common
root, was affected. When the heart of a root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the
branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the
branches; and when the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would
it have fared with all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent de-
pravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would
have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with re-
lation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution, and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each
branch, as in the root. Now, difference of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the
same order, any more than difference of place in a co-existence of time. Here may be observed, as in several re-
spects to the present purpose, some things are said by STAPFERUS, an eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland,
in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen years ago:—in English as follows. “Seeing all Adam’s pos-
terity are derived from their first parent, as their root, the whole of human kind, with its root, may be considered
as constituting but one whole, or one mass; so as not to be properly distinct from its root; the posterity not dif-
fering from it, any otherwise than the branches of from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that when
the root sinned, all which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also
sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the root, but one with it.”—Tom. i. cap. 3. § 856. 57. “It is objected, against
the imputation of Adam’s sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam, neither in number or in kind.
I answer, we should distinguish here between the physical act itself, which Adam committed, and the morality
of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the external act, to be sure it must be confessed, that
Adam’s posterity did not put forth their hands to the forbidden fruit: in which sense, that act of transgression,
and that fall of Adam, cannot be physically one with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the morality of
the action, and what consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the
same sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where
there is consent to a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his posterity
constitute but one moral person, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law,
they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law,
both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin
of Adam to all mankind or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned,
we may rather argue thus: the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they
are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is
rightfully imputed to his posterity.”—Id. Tom. iv. cap. 16. § 60, 61. The imputation of Adam’s first sin consists
in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him.
But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment,
which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could
not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature: therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute
Adam’s sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one
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CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.