1. For after all that opinion on
the subject of matter does not turn out to be beyond what appears
consistent, which declares that it has its existence from Him Who is
intelligible and immaterial. For we shall find all matter to be
composed of certain qualities, of which if it is divested it can, in
itself, be by no means grasped by idea. Moreover in idea each kind of
quality is separated from the substratum; but idea is an intellectual
and not a corporeal method of examination. If, for instance, some
animal or tree is presented to our notice, or any other of the things
that have material existence, we perceive in our mental discussion of
it many things concerning the substratum, the idea of each of which is
clearly distinguished from the object we contemplate: for the idea of
colour is one, of weight another; so again that of quantity and of such
and such a peculiar quality of touch: for “softness,” and
“two cubits long,” and the rest of the attributes we spoke
of, are not connected in idea either with one another or with the body:
each of them has conceived concerning it its own explanatory definition
according to its being, having nothing in common with any other of the
qualities that are contemplated in the substratum.