Does he, by what still remains,
make at all more secure this headless and rootless statement of his, in
which, in its earliest stage, nothing was laid down that had any force
with regard to the point he is trying to establish? or does the rest
also cling to the same folly, not deriving its strength from any
support it gets from argument, but setting out its exposition of
blasphemy with vague details like the recital of dreams? He says (and
this he subjoins to what I have already quoted)—“Having its
generation without intervention, and preserving indivisible its
relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator.” Well, if we were
to leave alone the absence of intervention and of division, and look at
the meaning of the words as it stands by itself, we shall find that
everywhere his absurd teaching is cast upon the ears of those whom he
deceives, without corroboration from a single argument. “Its
Generator, and Maker, and Creator,” he says. These names, though
they seem to be three, include the sense of but two concepts, since two
of the words are equivalent in meaning. For to make is the same as to
create, but generation is another thing distinct from those spoken of.
Now, seeing that the result of the signification of the words is to
divide the ordinary apprehension of men into different ideas, what
argument demonstrates to us that making is the same thing with
generation, to the end that we may accommodate the one essence to this
difference of terms? For so long as the ordinary significance of the
words holds, and no argument is found to transfer the sense of the
terms to an opposite meaning, it is not possible that any one nature
should be divided between the conception of “product of
making,” and that of “product of generation.” Since
each of these terms, used by itself, has a meaning of its own, we must
also suppose the relative conjunction in which they stand to be
appropriate and germane to the terms. For all other relative terms have
their connection, not with what is foreign and heterogeneous, but, even
if the correlative term be suppressed, we hear spontaneously, together
with the primary word, that which is linked with it, as in the case of
“maker,” “slave,” “friend,”
“son,” and so forth. For all names that are considered as
relative to another, present to us, by the mention of them, each its
proper and closely connected relationship with that which it declares,
while they avoid all mixture of that which is heterogeneous E.g.“A thing made”
suggests to us the thought of a “maker,” “a
maker” the thought of the thing made; and they suggest also a
close connection as existing between the two correlative terms of one
of which the name is uttered; but neither suggests in the same way any
term which is not correlative, or with which it is not, in some manner,
in pari materia.. For neither is the name of
“maker” linked with the word “son,” nor the
term “slave” referred to the term “maker,” nor
does “friend” present to us a “slave,” nor
“son” a “master,” but we recognize clearly and
distinctly the connection of each of these with its correlative,
conceiving by the word “friend” another friend; by
“slave,” a master; by “maker,” work; by
“son,” a father. In the same way, then, “product of
generation” has its proper relative sense; with the
“product of generation,” surely, is linked the
generator, and with the “product of creation” the
creator; and we must certainly, if we are not prepared by a
substitution of names to introduce a confusion of
things, preserve for each of the relative terms that which it properly
connotes.