or become such as they are, rather than otherwise, by some sufficient cause or reason, in
perfect consistency with their being acts of will, or in perfect consistency with that power
of willing which constitutes freedom of agency. On the ground that the power of willing
pertains to man, the author asserts a natural ability, which is the just occasion of precept,
invitation, &c. or of the will of God being addressed to him, and on the ground that his acts
of will are rendered certain, by a sufficient cause, the author asserts a moral inability. The
principal point contended for, and which is most essential to the defence of the Calvinistic
scheme of faith, in distinction from the Arminian, is the latter one, that the acts of the will
are rendered certain by some other cause than the mere power of willing. What the particular
cause or causes may be, is not particularly considered, but this question is dismissed with
a few brief remarks. The fact, that there is and must be, some such cause, is the great subject
argued, and most powerfully demonstrated. This cause he asserts is the foundation of neces-
sity, in the sense merely of certainty of action, and does not therefore destroy natural ability
or the power of choice, nor imply that man acts otherwise than electively, or by choice; so
that it is a necessity consistent with accountability, demerit, or the contrary and so with re-
wards and punishments. He asserts that all such terms as must, cannot, impossible, tenable,
irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied here, are not applied in their proper
signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense
quite diverse from their proper and original meaning, and their use in common speech; and
that such a necessity as attends the acts of men’s wills, is more properly called certainty than
necessity.
Rightly to understand this controversy, it must be observed, that he and his opponents,
alike, considered sin to consist in acts of will. Had this not been the case, it would have been
idle for Mr. Edwards to have confined himself, in his whole treatise, to acts of choice, and
the manner in which they are determined, i.e. rendered certain. He must, in that case, have
agitated the previous question, respecting acts of choice themselves; and have asserted and
maintained, that something else of specifically a different nature, enters into moral character,
and forms the ground of praise and blame, or retribution. But the question which he con-
sidered to be at issue, is this: Does the mind will, in any given manner, without a motive,
cause or ground, which renders the given choice, rather than a different choice, certain. Whitby,
the writer whom he especially has in view, in his remarks on the freedom of man, asserts,
that man, by his own activity alone, decides the choice. Mr. Edwards acknowledges that
man chooses; but asserts, in opposition to the opinion of Whitby, and those who side with
him, that there must be some other ground or cause, beside the mere activity of man, or his
power of choosing, which occasions his choosing in one manner, rather than another. He
asserts, that “doubtless common sense requires men’s being the authors of their own acts
of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on account of them.”
The very act of volition itself, is, doubtless, a determination; i.e. it is the mind’s drawing up
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CHAPTER XXII. Letter to his eldest son. Return of greater PART of the Mohawks.…