them; 2494 so that even in this respect we do not possess free-will. Now to this we have to
answer, that the language of the apostle does not assert that to will evil is of God, or to will
good is of Him (and similarly with respect to doing better and worse); but that to will in a
general 2495 way, and to run in a general way, (are from Him). For as we have from God
(the property) of being living things and human beings, so also have we that of willing
generally, and, so to speak, of motion in general. And as, possessing (the property) of life
and of motion, and of moving, e.g., these members, the hands or the feet, we could not
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rightly say 2496 that we had from God this species of motion, 2497 whereby we moved to
strike, or destroy, or take away another’s goods, but that we had received from Him simply
the generic 2498 power of motion, which we employed to better or worse purposes; so we
have obtained from God (the power) of acting, in respect of our being living things, and
(the power) to will from the Creator 2499 while we employ the power of will, as well as that
of action, for the noblest objects, or the opposite.
20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we
are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, “Therefore
hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt
say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O
man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed
it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump
to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” 2500 For it will be said: If
the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God
thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend
upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with
these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I
presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter
contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find
fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who
had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had
been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does
the house of Onesiphorus in these words: “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus;
2494 ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐδόξαμεν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ταῦτα ἐδωρήσατο.
2495 τὸ καθόλου θέλειν.
2496 εὐλόγως.
2497 τὸ εἰδικὸν τόδε.
2498 τὸ μὲν γενικὸν, τὸ κινεῖσθαι.
2499 δημιουργοῦ.
2500 Rom. ix. 18–21.
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Chapter I. translated from the Greek: On the Freedom of the Will, With…