SECT. I.
God’s moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.
Having considered the first thing proposed, relating to that freedom of Will which
Arminians maintain; namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, I
come now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz. Whether any such
kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and
punishment, &c.
I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral
Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue.
Dr. Whitby in his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 14.) says, “If all human actions are
necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is
blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could
not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?” To the like
purpose he speaks in places innumerable; especially in his Discourse on the Freedom of the
Will; constantly maintaining, that a freedom not only from co-action, but necessity, is abso-
lutely requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And
to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of Arminian writers, who, in general,
hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or
blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby (p. 300.) allows, that God is without this
freedom; and, Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge,
that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined to that which is good.
So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God—who always used to be
esteemed by God’s people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in
the most absolute purity and perfection, brightness and amiableness; the most perfect pattern
of virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun; and who has
been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in Scripture,) on the account of
his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired,
commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature—this Being, according to this notion
of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is
but on empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under
necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it.
It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c. of the Most High, must not be accounted to
be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these
things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous,
or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is
not a moral agent; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but
not virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-
determining power.
SECTION I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praise-worthy.
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SECTION I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praise-worthy.…