Gregory adopted it, with the
other great doctrine which in the mind of Origen accompanied it; i.e.,
that evil is caused, not by matter, but by the act of this free will of
man; in other words, by sin. Again the fatalism of all the
emanationists had to be combated as to the nature and necessity of
evil. With them evil was some inevitable result of the Divine
processes; it abode at all events in matter, and human responsibility
was at an end. Greek philosophy from first to last had shewed, even at
its best, a tendency to connect evil with the lower φύσις. But now, in the light of revelation, a new truth was set forth,
and repeated again and again by the very men who were inclined to adopt
Plato’s rather Dualistic division of the world into the
intelligible and sensible. ‘Evil was due to an act of the will of
man.’ Moreover it could no longer be regarded per se: it was relative, being a
‘default,’ or ‘failure,’ or ‘turning away
from the true good’ of the will, which, however, was always free
to rectify this failure. It was a στέρησις,—loss of the good; but it did not stand over against
the good as an independent power. Origen contemplated the time when
evil would cease to exist; ‘the non-existent cannot exist for
ever:’ and Gregory did the same.