But if he should still answer
with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only
the term Father, and the term Creator, that are applied to God as
expressing production, both words being so applied, as he says, because
of an operation, then he will cut short our long discussion of this
subject, by thus conceding what it would have required a laborious
argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word
Creator have the same meaning (for both arise from an operation), one
of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, since if
the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If,
then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it
is quite allowable to interchange the names, and to turn one into the
other and say that God is Creator of the Son, and Father of a stone,
seeing that the term Father is to be devoid of any meaning of essential
relation τῆς κατα
φύσιν
σχετικῆς
σημασίας.. Well, the monstrous conclusion that
is hereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who reflect. For as it
is absurd to deem a stone, or anything else that exists by creation,
Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in
the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an
operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns,
according to Eunomius, both these terms to Him. But let us hold to the
question before us. He abuses our assertion that our knowledge of God
is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and
says that the proof of His simplicity is destroyed by us so, since He
must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue
of a share in them can completely fill out His essence. Here I write in
my own language, curtailing his wearisome prolixity; and in answer to
his foolish and nerveless redundancy no sensible person, I think, would
make any reply, except as regards his charging us with
“senselessness.” Now if anything of that description had
been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly
worded, or, if there was any doubt as to its meaning, to put an
irreproachable interpretation upon it. But we have not said anything of
the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to
any such necessity. Why, then, linger on that to which all assent, and
weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so devoid of
reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions
of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking of Him, that
the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His
actual fulness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has
made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has
made discoveries also in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and
grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow,
because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection
with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a
composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between
medicine and astronomy; and grammar means nothing in common with
geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is within the
bounds of possibility that the idea of each of these sciences should be
associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite,
or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending
into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied
to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity, how can any one
imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and
eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names
are made to mean one thing, become of many parts, or take a share of
all these to make up the perfection of His nature?