What, then, out of all that we
have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which
he returns to the charge and repeats himself in these words: “He
will, then, be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and,
as unending, at once imperishable and generated.” It is plain to
any possessing the least reflection, without our testing this
logically, how absurdly foolish it is, or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By
the same argument as that whereby he establishes this union of the
perishable and the unbeginning, he can make sport of any proper and
worthily conceived name for the Deity. For it is not these two ideas
only that we associate with the Divine Life, I mean, the being without
beginning, and the not admitting of dissolution; but It is called as
well immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible
and formless, true and just; and there are numberless other ways of
thinking about the Divine Life, each one of which is announced by an
expressive sound with a peculiar meaning of its own. Well, to any
name—any name, I mean, expressive of some proper conception of
the Deity—it is open for us to apply this method of unnatural
union devised by Eunomius. For instance, immateriality and absence of
anger are both predicated of the Divine Life; but not with the same
thought in both cases; for by the term immaterial we convey the idea of
purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term “without
anger” the strangeness to any emotion of anger. Now in all
probability Eunomius will run trippingly over all this, and have his
dance, just as before, upon our words. Stringing together his
absurdities in the same way, he will say: “If wherein He is
separated from all mixture with matter He is called immaterial, in this
respect He will not be without anger; and if by reason of His not
indulging in anger He is without anger, it is impossible to attribute
to him immateriality, but logic will compel us to admit that, in so far
as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful;”
and so you will find the same to be the case in respect to his other
attributes. And if you like we will propound another pairing of the
same, i.e. His immutability and His incorporeality. For both
these terms being used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their
case also Eunomius’ skill will embellish the same absurdity. For
if His being always as He is is signified by the term immutable, and if
the term incorporeal represents the spirituality of His essence,
Eunomius will certainly say the same here also, that the terms are
irreconcilable, and alien to each other, and that the notions which our
minds attach to them have no point of contact one with the other; for
insofar as God is always the same He is immutable, but not incorporeal;
and in regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His essence,
while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable;
so that it happens that when immutability is considered with respect to
the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It
is corporeal; but if spirituality is the object of search, you prove
that It is at once incorporeal and mutable.