But what, I asked, if, insisting
on the great differences which, in spite of a certain quality of matter shared
alike by all elements in their visible form, exist between each
particular kind of matter (motion, for instance, is not the same in
all, some moving up, some down; nor form, nor quality either), some one
were to say that there was in the same manner incorporated in, and
belonging to, these elements a certain force εἴ τινα
τούτων κατὰ
τὸν αὐτὁν
λόγον
συνουσιωμένην
τις εἶναι
λέγοι
δύναμιν,
κ.τ.λ. The difficulty here is
in τούτων,
which Krabinger takes as a partitive genitive after εἶναι, and refers to the “elements”; and this is perhaps
the best way of taking it. But still, as Schmidt points out, it is
rather the human body than the elements themselves that ought here to
be spoken of as the efficient cause of thought: and so he would either
refer τούτων to τὸν
αὐτὸν (“in the
same way as these instances just given”), and compares Eurip.
Helen., ὄνομα δὲ
ταὐτὸν τῆς
ἐμῆς ἔχουσά
τις δάμαρτος
ἄλλη (Matt. Gr. p. 706);
or else would join τούτων with
the preceding διάφορος (with Codd. Mon. D, E). as
well which effects these intellectual insights and operations by a
purely natural effort of their own (such effects, for instance, as we
often see produced by the mechanists, in whose hands matter, combined
according to the rules of Art, thereby imitates Nature, exhibiting
resemblance not in figure alone but even in motion, so that when the
piece of mechanism sounds in its resonant part it mimics a human voice,
without, however, our being able to perceive anywhere any mental force
working out the particular figure, character, sound, and movement);
suppose, I say, we were to affirm that all this was produced as well in
the organic machine of our natural bodies, without any intermixture of
a special thinking substance, but owing simply to an inherent motive
power of the elements within us accomplishing Cod.
Mon. D, ἀποτελούσης. This seems a better reading than that preferred by
Krabinger, ἀποτέλεσμα
εἶναι: for
ἀποτέλεσμα
must be pressed to mean, in order to preserve the
sense, “mere result,” i.e. something secondary, and
not itself a principle or cause: the following ἥ, besides, cannot without
awkwardness be referred to ἐνέργειαν by
itself these operations—to nothing else, in fact, but an
impulsive movement working for the cognition of the object before us;
would not then the fact stand proved of the absolute nonexistence Reading οὐσιὰν οὐκ
ἂν
ἀποδεικνύοιτο
ἦ τὸ μηδ᾽
ὅλως εἶναι; of that intellectual and impalpable Being,
the soul, which you talk of?