From his writings, I say, for I
do not like to insert in my own work the nauseous stuff our rhetorician
utters, or to display his ignorance and folly to contempt in the midst
of my own arguments. He goes on with a sort of eulogy upon the class of
significant words which express the subject, and, in his accustomed
style, patches and sticks together the cast-off rags of phrases: poor
Isocrates is nibbled at once more, and shorn of words and figures to
make out the point proposed,—here and there even the Hebrew Philo
receives the same treatment, and makes him a contribution of phrases
from his own labours,—yet not even thus is this much-stitched and
many-coloured web of words finished off, but every assault, every
defence of his conceptions, all his artistic preparation, spontaneously
collapses, and, as commonly happens with the bubbles when the drops,
borne down from above through a body of waters against some obstacle,
produce those foamy swellings which, as soon as they gather,
immediately dissolve, and leave upon the water no trace of their own
formation—such are the air-bubbles of our author’s
thoughts, vanishing without a touch at the moment they are put forth.
For after all these irrefragable statements, and the dreamy
philosophizing wherein he asserts that the distinct character of the
essence is apprehended by the divergence of names, as some mass of foam
borne downstream breaks up when it comes into contact with any more
solid body, so his argument, following its own spontaneous course, and
coming unexpectedly into collision with the truth, disperses into
nothingness its unsubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For
he speaks in these words:—“Who is so foolish and so far
removed from the constitution of men, as, in discoursing of men to
speak of one as a man, and, calling another a horse, so to compare
them?” I would answer him,—“You are right in calling
any one foolish who makes such blunders in the use of names. And I will
employ for the support of the truth the testimony you yourself give.
For if it is a piece of extreme folly to call one a horse and another a
man, supposing both were really men, it is surely a piece of equal
stupidity, when the Father is confessed to be God, and the Son is
confessed to be God, to call the one ‘created’ and the
other ‘uncreated,’ since, as in the other case humanity, so
in this case the Godhead does not admit a change of name to that
expressive of another kind. For what the irrational is with respect to
man, that also the creature is with respect to the Godhead, being
equally unable to receive the same name with the nature that is
superior to it. And as it is not possible to apply the same definition
to the rational animal and the quadruped alike (for each is naturally
differentiated by its special property from the other), so neither can
you express by the same terms the created and the uncreated essence,
seeing that those attributes which are predicated of the latter essence
are not discoverable in the former. For as rationality is not
discoverable in a horse, nor solidity of hoofs in a man, so neither is
Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the attribute of being
created in the Godhead: but if He be God He is certainly not created,
and if He be created He is not God; unless Altering Oehler’s punctuation., of
course, one were to apply by some misuse or customary mode of
expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses have men’s
names given them by their owners; yet neither is the horse a man,
though he be called by a human name, nor is the created being God, even
though some claim for him the name of Godhead, and give him the benefit
of the empty sound of a dissyllable.” Since, then,
Eunomius’ heretical statement is found spontaneously to fall in
with the truth, let him take his own advice and stand by his own words,
and by no means retract his own utterances, but consider that the man
is really foolish and stupid who names the subject not according as it
is, but says “horse” for “man,” and
“sea” for “sky,” and “creature” for
“God.” And let no one think it unreasonable that the
creature should be set in opposition to God, but have regard to the
prophets and to the Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the
Father, “My Hand made all these things” Is. lxvi. 2. Not verbally
from the LXX.,
meaning by “Hand,” in his dark saying, the power of the
Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things are of the Father,
and that all things are by the Son Cf. 1 Cor. viii. 6., and the
prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which
itself also is given through the Spirit. For in the one passage, the
prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him
Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things which have come
into being in its relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made them
is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things. And
again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division of
entities, making all things depend upon their productive cause, yet not
reckoning in the number of “all things” that which produces
them: so that we are hereby taught the difference of nature between the
created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature,
that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another.
Since, then, all things are of God, and the Son is God, the creation is
properly opposed to the Godhead; while, since the Only-begotten is
something else than the nature of the universe (seeing that not even
those who fight against the truth contradict this), it follows of
necessity that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless
the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all things
were made.