268 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision,
and from the will which unites both. And when these three
things are combined into one, from that combination^ itself
they are called thought.^ And in these three there is no
longer any diversity of substance. For neither is the sensible
body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of
the living being, nor is the bodily sense there informed so as
to produce vision, nor does the will itself perform its office of
applying the sense, that is to be informed, to the sensible
body, and of retaining it in it when informed : but in place of
that bodily species which was perceived from without, there
comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has
imbibed through the bodily sense ; and in place of that vision
which was outward when the sense was informed through the
sensible body, there comes a similar vision within, while the
eye of the mind is informed from that which the memory
retains, and the corporeal things that are thought of are absent
;
and the will itself, as before it applied the sense yet to be
informed to the corporeal thing presented from without,
and united it thereto when informed, so now turns the sight
of the mind that recollects, to the memory, in order that the
mental sight may be informed by that which the memory has
retained, and so there may be in the thought a like vision.
And as it was the reason that distinguished the visible appear-
ance by which the bodily sense was informed, from the simili-
tude of it, which was wrought in the sense when informed in
order to produce vision (otherwise they had been so united as
to be thought altogether one and the same) ; so, although that
phantasy also, which arises from the mind thinking of the ap-
pearance of a body that it has seen, consists of the similitude
of the body which the memory retains, together with that
which is thence formed in the eye of the mind that recollects
;
yet it so seems to be one and single, that it can only be dis-
covered to be two by the judgment of reason, by which we
understand that which remains in the memory, even when we
think it from some other source, to be a different thing from
that which is brought into being when we remember, that is,
come back again to the memory, and there find the same ap-
* Coactus. ^ Cogitatio.