Section II.
Concerning the Determination of the Will.
BY determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended,
causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not
otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action,
or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As
when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the
body to be in such a direction, rather than another.
The Determination of the Will, supposes
an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner.
This must be supposed to be intended even by them that say, The Will determines
itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a cause that
acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and
action.
With respect to that grand inquiry, “What
determines the Will?” it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to
examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter;
nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular discussion of all points
debated in disputes on that other question, “Whether the Will always follows the
last dictate of the understanding?” It is sufficient to my present purpose to say,
It is that motive, which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest,
that determines the will. But may be necessary that I should a little explain
my meaning.
By motive I mean the whole
of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one
thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and
unite their strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as
one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have
respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of
volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.
Whatever is objectively a motive, in this
sense, must, be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding,
or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act
any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind’s
view; for what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind’s view, cannot
affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches
it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.
And I think it must also be allowed by
all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement
to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of tendency, or
advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act
of the will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the
strength of the motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous
advantage, or tendency to move the Will, or which appears less inviting, as it stands
in the view of the mind, is What I call a weaker motive. On the contrary,
that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the
understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite
and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive. And in
this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest motive.
Things that exist in the view of the mind
have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move, or excite its Will, from many
things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature
and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and manner of
its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so
much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever
is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the
nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed
as good; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further
degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things
that appear, have a tendency, by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to
elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd.
And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the will always is, as
the greatest apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of
this, two things must be well and distinctly observed.
1. It must be observed in what sense
I use the term “good;” namely, as of the same import with “agreeable.” To appear
good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem
pleasing to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind,
or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable;
nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends
to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that
which suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract
and engage it, which as it stands in the mind’s view, suits it best, and pleases
it most; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good: to say otherwise, is
little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.
The word “good,” in this sense, includes
in its signification, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable
and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing,
and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes
determines the will. For when he speaks of “uneasiness,” as determining the will,
he must be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition
or act of preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness; and that
is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.
2.When I say, that the will is as
the greatest apparent good, or, (as I have explained it,) that volition has always
for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed,
to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate
object of the act of volition; and not some object to which the act of will has
only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of volition have some remote relation
to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen.
Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to
drink it, or no; the immediate objects, about which his present volition is conversant,
and between which his choice now decides, are his own nets, in drinking the liquor,
or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present
view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses
to drink it, and not to let it alone, then this action, as it stands in the view
of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and
pleasing than letting it alone.
But the objects to which this act of volition
may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may determine more indirectly,
are the present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which
he judges will be the consequence of it: he may judge that this future misery, when
it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than refraining from drinking
now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition
spoken of is next conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is concerning
present drinking, or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is
the proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on some account or other,
now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain,
then refraining is immediate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If
in the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage,
which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears
more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If on the contrary
a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him
best. And so still, the present volition is, as the greatest apparent good at present
is.
I have rather chosen to express myself
thus, “that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good,” or “as what appears
most agreeable,” than to say “that the will is determined by the greatest apparent
good,” or “by what seems most agreeable;” because an appearing most agreeable to
the mind, and the mind’s preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety
of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action,
which is the immediate consequence of the mind’s choice, is determined by that which
appears most agreeable, than the choice itself; but that volition itself is always
determined by that in or about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to
appear most agreeable. I say, “in or about the mind’s view of' the object;” because
what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears
in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view and the state and circumstances
of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind’s
view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable
to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise
by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention
some things in general.
I. One thing that makes an object proposed
to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances of the object.
And there are various things of this sort, that have influence in rendering the
object more or less agreeable; as, 1. That which appears in the object, rendering
it beautiful and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind; viewing it as it
is in itself.
2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble
attending the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequences
being viewed as circumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to
it; and as it were parts of it, as it stands in the mind’s view a proposed object
of choice.
3. The apparent state of the pleasure or
trouble that appears, with respect to distance of time; being either nearer or farther
off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and
disagreeable, to have it delayed: so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure
set in the mind’s view, and all other things are equal, but one is beheld as near,
and the other afar off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen.
Because, though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in
themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the additional
agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.
II. Another thing that contributes to the
agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind’s view, is the manner
of view. If the object be something which appears connected with future pleasure,
not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner
of the view, especially in two respects.
1. With respect to the degree of assent,
with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable
to have a certain happiness, than an uncertain one; and a pleasure viewed as more
probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that
which is viewed as less probable.
2. With respect to the degree of the idea
or apprehension of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject
of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or
apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively,
and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation, are
usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation
of them when absent. My idea of the sun when I look upon it is more vivid, than
when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is
usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes,
the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than
at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure
which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves, than at another.
Now the strength of the idea or the sense that men have of future good or evil,
is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite volition. When two
kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice, though both are supposed exactly
equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, yet of one the mind has a far more
lively sense, than of the other; this last has the greatest advantage by far to
affect and attract the mind, and move the will. It is now more agreeable to the
mind, to take the pleasure of which it has a strong and lively sense, than that
of which it has only a faint idea. The view of the former is attended with the strongest
appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it; and it is agreeable
to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several
future enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind,
some of them judged to be greater, and others less; the mind also having a more
lively idea of the good of some, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of
greater certainty or probability than others; and those enjoyments that appear most
agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others: in this case, all
other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will
be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment,
the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of
the liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because all together concur
to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly
will volition be determined.
I might further observe, that the
state of the mind which views a proposed object of choice, is another thing
that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object; the particular
temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established
by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the
mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one,
does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable
to the same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow
their reason; and to others, to follow their appetites: to some men, it is more
agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, than to gratify it; others it suits best
to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others,
to counteract a former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might
be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and
not only so, but to the same persons at different times.
But possibly it is needless to mention
the “state of the mind,” as a ground of the agreeableness of objects distinct from
the other two mentioned before; viz. The apparent nature and circumstances
of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly consider
the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to
the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves
appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending
them; and, as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea
of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively. However,
I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned,
is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained.
The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect
to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing,
all things considered. If the immediate objects of the will are a man’s own actions,
then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most
agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If
it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak,
then he chooses to speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses
to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense
and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they
please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.
To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to them, is
the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure;
and that is to say, that they do what they please and yet do not what they please.
It appears from these things, that in some
sense, the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.
But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole
faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment.
If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best,
or most for the person’s happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not
true, that the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a
dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable,
all things being put together which pertain to the mind’s present perceptions in
any respect: although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, has concern in
the compound influence which moves Will; and should be considered in estimating
the degree of that appearance of good which the Will always follows; either as having
its influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When such dictate of
reason concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into
the same scale ; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite
scale, resisting the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome
by their greater weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition
to it.
These things may serve, I hope, in some
measure, illustrate and confirm the position laid down in the beginning of this
section, viz. “That the Will is always determined by the strongest motive,” or by
that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to
excite volition. But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing
wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not
overthrow the position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and
is a point of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse: And the
truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what
I have to say on the subject of human liberty.