It remains to see whether it
contributes anything further to the proof of his blasphemy. What, then,
was he aiming at? The necessity of believing in accordance with their
being in the likeness or unlikeness of the Son to the Father; and, as
we cannot know about this being from considerations of Providence, the
necessity of having recourse to the “manner of the
generation,” whereby we may know, not indeed whether the Begotten
is like the Begetter (absolutely), but only a certain “manner of
likeness” between them; and as this manner is a secret to the
many, the necessity of going at some length into the being of the
Begetter. Then has he forgotten his own definitions about the beings
having to be known from their works? But this begotten being, which he
calls the work of the supreme being, has as yet no light thrown upon it
(according to him); so how can its nature be dealt with? And how can he
“mount above this lower and therefore more directly
comprehensible thing,” and so cling to the absolute and supreme
being? Again, he always throughout his discourse lays claim to an
accurate knowledge of the divine utterances; yet here he pays them
scant reverence, ignoring the fact that it is not possible to approach
to a knowledge of the Father except through the Son. “No man
knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son shall
reveal Him Matt. xi. 27..” Yet Eunomius, while on every
occasion, where he can insult our devout and God-adoring conceptions of
the Son, he asserts in plain words the Son’s inferiority,
establishes His superiority unconsciously in this device of his for
knowing the Deity; for he assumes that the Father’s being lends
itself the more readily to our comprehension, and then attempts to
trace and argue out the Son’s nature from that.