This transcendent idealism
embarrasses him in many ways, and makes his theory of the soul full of
inconsistency. (1) He will not say unhesitatingly whether that pure
humanity in the beginning created in the image of God had a body or not
like ours. Origen at all events says that the eternally pre-existing
spirits were invested with a body, even before falling into the
sensible world. But Gregory, while denying the pre-existence of souls
in the sense of Origen, yet in many of his treatises, especially in the
De Hom. Opificio, seems to point to a primitive humanity, a
predeterminate number of souls destined to live in the body though they
had not yet lived, which goes far beyond Origen’s in its ideal
character. “When Moses,” Gregory says, “speaks of the
soul as the image of God, he shows that all that is alien to God must
be excluded from our definition of the soul; and a corporal nature is
alien to God.” He points out that God first ‘made man in
His own image,’ and after that made them male and female;
so that there was a double fashioning of our nature, ἥ τε
πρὸς τὸ θεῖον
ὁμοιωμένη, ἥ
τε πρὸς τὴν
διαφορὰν
ταύτην (i.e.
male and female) διηρημένη. On the other hand, in the Oratio Catechetica,
which contains certainly his more dogmatic statement on every point,
this ideal and passionless humanity is regarded as still in the future:
and it is represented that man’s double-nature is actually the
very centre of the Divine Councils, and not the result of any mistake
or sin; man’s soul from the very first was commingled
(ἀνάκρασις is Gregory’s favourite word) with a body, in order
that in him, as representing every stage of living things, the whole
creation, even in its lowest part, might share in the divine. Man, as
the paragon of animals, was necessary, in order that the union might be
effected between two otherwise irreconcilable worlds, the intelligible
and the sensible. Though, therefore, there was a Fall at last, it was
not the occasion of man’s receiving a body similar to animals;
that body was given him at the very first, and was only preparatory to
the Fall, which was foreseen in the Divine Councils and provided for.
Both the body and the Fall were necessary in order that the Divine plan
might be carried out, and the Divine glory manifested in creation. In
this view the “coats of skins” which Gregory inherits from
the allegorical treasures of Origen are no longer merely the human body
itself, as with Origen, but all the passions, actions, and habits of
that body after the Fall, which he sums up in the generic term
πάθη. If, then, there is to be any reconciliation between this and the
former view of his in which the pure unstained humanity, the
‘image of God,’ is differentiated by a second act of
creation as it were into male and female, we must suppose him to teach
that immediately upon the creation in God’s image there was added
all that in human nature is akin to the merely animal world. In that
man was God’s image, his will was free, but in that he was
created, he was able to fall from his high estate; and God, foreseeing
the Fall, at once added the distinction of sex, and with it the other
features of the animal which would befit the fall; but with the purpose
of raising thereby the whole creation. But two great counter-influences
seem always to be acting upon Gregory; the one sympathy with the
speculations of Origen, the other a tendency to see even with a modern
insight into the closeness of the intercommunion between soul and body.
The results of these two influences cannot be altogether reconciled.
His ideal and his actual man, each sketched with a skilful and discriminating
hand, represent the interval that divides his aspirations from his
observations: yet both are present to his mind when he writes about the
soul. (2) He does not alter, as Origen does, the traditional belief in
the resurrection of the body, and yet his idealism, in spite of his
actual and strenuous defence of it in the carefully argued treatise
On the Soul and Resurrection, renders it unnecessary, if not
impossible. We know that his faith impelled Origen, too, to He does
so De Principiis I. præf. 5. C. Cels. II. 77, VIII.
49 sq. contend for the resurrection of the flesh: yet
it is an almost forced importation into the rest of his system. Our
bodies, he teaches, will rise again: but that which will make us the
same persons we were before is not the sameness of our bodies (for they
will be ethereal, angelic, uncarnal, &c.) but the sameness of
a λόγος within
them which never dies (λόγος τις
ἔγκειται τῷ
σώματι, ἀφ᾽
οὗ μὴ
φθειρομένου
ἐγείρεται τὸ
σῶμα ἐν
ἀφθαρσί& 139·, c. Cels. v. 23). Here we have the λόγοι
σπερματικοὶ; which Gregory objected to as somehow connected in his
mind with the infinite plurality of worlds. Yet his own account of the
Resurrection of the flesh is nothing but Origenism, mitigated by the
suppression of these λόγοι. With him,
too, matter is nothing, it is a negative thing that can make and effect
nothing: the soul, the ζωτικὴ
δύναμις does everything; it is gifted by him with a sort of ubiquity after
death. ‘Nothing can break its sympathetic union with the
particles of the body.’ It is not a long and difficult study for
it to discern in the mass of elements that which is its own from that
which is not its own. ‘It watches over its property, as it were,
until the Resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them anew De
Anim. et Resurrectione, p. 198, 199, 213
sq..’ It is only a change of names:
the λόγος has become
this ζωτικὴ
δύναμις or ψυχὴ, which seems
itself, almost unaided, to effect the whole Resurrection. Though he
teaches as against Origen that the ‘elements’ are the same
‘elements,’ the body the same body as before, yet the
strange importance both in activity and in substance which he attaches
to the ψυχὴ even in the
disembodied state seems to render a Resurrection of the flesh
unnecessary. Here, too, his view of the plan of Redemption is at
variance with his idealistic leanings. While Origen regarded the body,
as it now is, as part of that ‘vanity’ placed upon the
creature which was to be laid aside at last, Gregory’s view of
the design of God in creating man at all absolutely required the
Resurrection of the flesh Oratio
Cat. 55 A. (ὡς ἂν
συνεπαρθείη
τῷ θεί& 251· τὸ
γή& 187·νον). Creation was to be saved by man’s carrying his created
body into a higher world: and this could only be done by a resurrection
of the flesh such as the Church had already set forth in her
creed.