This brings us to the question in what sense
οὐσία is used in the
Nicene definition. We must remember the strong Western and
anti-Origenist influence which prevailed in the council (above, p.
xvii.), and the use of ὑπόστασις and οὐσία as convertible terms
in the anathematism (see Excursus A, pp. 77, sqq. below). Now
going back for a moment to the correspondence of the two Dionysii, we
see that Dionysius of Rome had contended not so much against the
subordination of the Son to the Father as against their undue
separation (μεμερισμέναι
ὑποστάσεις).
In other words he had pressed the ὁμοούσιον upon
his namesake in the interest rather of the unity than of the
equality of the Persons in the Holy Trinity. At Nicæa, the
problem was (as shewn above) to explain (at least negatively) how the
Church understood the Generation of the Son. Accordingly we find
Athanasius in later years explaining that the Council meant to place
beyond doubt the Essential Relation of the Divine Persons to one
another (τὸ ἴδιον
τῆς οὐσίας,
ταὐτότης, see de
Decr. pp. 161, 163 sq., 165, 168, 319; of course including
identity of Nature, pp. 396, 413, 232), and maintaining to the end
(where he expresses his own view, p. 490, &c.) the convertibility
of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις for this
purpose. By the word ὁ θεός or θεός he understands οὐδὲν
ἕτερον ἢ τὴν
οὐσίαν τοῦ
ὄντος (de Decr. 22). The
conclusion is that in their original sense the definitions of
Nicæa assert not merely the specific identity of the Son
with the Father (as Peter qua man is of one οὐσία with Paul, or the
Emperor’s statue of one form with the Emperor himself, p. 396),
but the full unbroken continuation of the Being of the Father in the
Son, the inseparable unity of the Son with the Father in the Oneness of
the Godhead. Here the phrase is ‘balanced’ by the ἐκ
τῆς [ὑποστάσεως
ἢ] οὐσίας τοῦ
Πατρὸς, not as though merely one
οὐσία had given
existence to another, but in the sense that with such origination the
οὐσία remained the
same. This is a ‘first approximation to the mysterious doctrine
of the περιχώρησις’
coinherence, or ‘circuminsessio,’ which is necessary to
guard the doctrine of the Trinity against tritheism, but which, it must
be observed, lifts it out of the reach of the categories of any system
of thought in which the workings of human intelligence have ever been
able to organise themselves. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity
vindicated by the Nicene formula on the one hand remains, after the
exclusion of others, as the one direction in which the Christian
intellect can travel without frustrating and limiting the movement of
faith, without bringing to a halt the instinct of faith in Christ as
Saviour, implanted in the Church by the teaching of S. Paul and of S.
John, of the Lord Himself: on the other hand it is not a full solution
of the intellectual difficulties with which the analysis of that faith
and those instincts brings us face to face. That God is One, and that
the Son is God, are truths of revelation which the category of
‘substance’ fails to synthesise. The Nicene Definition
furnishes a basis of agreement for the purpose of Christian devotion,
worship, and life, but leaves two theologies face to face, with mutual
recognition as the condition of the healthy life of either. The
theology of Athanasius and of the West is that of the Nicene formula in
its original sense. The inseparable Unity of the God of Revelation is
its pivot. The conception of personality in the Godhead is its
difficulty. The distinctness of the Father, Son, and Spirit is felt
(ἄλλος
ὁ Πατήρ ἄλλος
ὁ υἱ& 231·ς), but cannot be
formulated so as to satisfy our full idea of personality. For this
Athanasius had no word; πρόσωπον meant too
little (implying as it did no more than an aspect possibly worn but for
a special period or purpose), ὑπόστασις (implying
such personality as separates Peter from Paul) too much. But he
recognised the admissibility of the sense in which the Nicene formula
eventually, in the theology of the Cappadocian fathers, won its way to
supremacy in the East. To them ὑπόστασις was
an appropriate term to express the distinction of Persons in the
Godhead, while οὐσία
expressed the divine Nature which they possessed in common (see
Excursus A. p. 77 sqq.). This sense of οὐσία approximated to
that of species, or εἶδος (Aristotle’s
‘secondary’ οὐσία), while that of ὑπόστασις
gravitated toward that of personality in the empirical sense. But in
neither case did the approximation amount to complete identity. The
idea of trine personality was limited by the consideration of the
Unity; the περιχώρησις
was recognised, although in a somewhat different form, the prominent
idea in Athanasius being that of coinherence or immanence,
whereas the Cappadocians, while using, of course, the language of John xiv. 11, yet prefer
the metaphor of successive dependence ὥσπερ
ἐξ ἁλύσεω. (Bas.
Ep. 38, p. 118 D). To Athanasius, the
Godhead is complete not in the Father alone, still less in the Three
Persons as parts of the one οὐσία, but in each Person
as much as in all. The Cappadocian Fathers go back to the
Origenist view that the Godhead is complete primarily in the Father
alone, but mediately in the Son or Spirit, by virtue of their
origination from the Father as πηγή or αἰτία τῆς
θεότητος. To Athanasius
the distinct Personality of Son and Spirit was the difficulty;
his difference from Origen was wide, from Marcellus subtle. To the
Cappadocians the difficulty was the Unity of the Persons; to
Marcellus they were toto cælo opposed, they are the pupils
of Origen Gregory
Thaumaturgus was the great Origenist influence in northern Asia Minor:
the Cappadocian fathers were also influenced in the direction of
the ὁμοούσιον by Apollinarius: see the correspondence between Basil and
the latter, Bas. Epp. 8, 9, edited by Dräseke in Ztschr.
für K.G. viii. 85 sqq. Apollinarius was of course
equally opposed to Arianism and to Origen: see also p. 449
sq.. Accordingly when Basil makes a distinction
between οὐσία and
ὑπόστασις in the
Nicene anathematism, he is giving not historical exegesis but his own
opinion.