342 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
which the sinner is bound, so long as he is abandoned by
the Lord, and acts under the yoke of the devil. Neverthe
less, there remains a will which both inclines and hastens
on with the strongest affection towards sin; man, when placed
under this bondage, being deprived not of will, but of sound
ness of .will. Bernard says not improperly, that all of us
have a will ; but to will well is proficiency, to will ill is defect.
Thus simply to will is the part of man, to will ill the part
of corrupt nature, to will well the part of grace. Moreover,
when I say that the will, deprived of liberty, is led or drag
ged by necessity to evil, it is strange that any should deem
the expression harsh, seeing there is no absurdity in it, and
it is not at variance with pious use. It does, however, offend
those who know not how to distinguish between necessity
and compulsion. Were any one to ask them, Is not God
necessarily good, is not the devil necessarily wicked, what
answer would they give ? The goodness of God is so con
nected with his Godhead, that it is not more necessary to
be God than to be good ; whereas the devil, by his fall, was
so estranged from goodness, that he can do nothing but evil.
Should any one give utterance to the profane jeer, (see
Calvin Adv. Pighium,) that little praise is due to God for a
goodness to which he is forced, is it not obvious to every
man to reply, It is owing not to violent impulse, but to his
boundless goodness, that he cannot do evil? Therefore, if
the free will of God in doing good is not impeded, because
he necessarily must do good ; if the devil, who can do no
thing but evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily ; can it be said
that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a neces
sity of sinning ? This necessity is uniformly proclaimed by
Augustine, who, even when pressed by the invidious cavil of
Celestius, hesitated not to assert it in the following terms :
"Man through liberty became a sinner, but corruption, ensuing
as the penalty, has converted liberty into necessity," (August. Lib. de Perf. Justit.) Whenever mention is made of the
subject, he hesitates not to speak in this way of the neces
sary bondage of sin, (August, de Natura et Gratia, et alibi.)
Let this, then, be regarded as the sum of the distinction.
Man, since he was corrupted by the fall, sins not forced or