draught of a liquor to which he had before no inclination; but after he has once taken of it,
he is observed to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same,
in his constant practice, obstinately continued in as long as he lives, against all possible ar-
guments and endeavors used to dissuade him from it. And suppose we should from hence
argue a fixed inclination, and begin to suspect that this is the nature and operation of the
poison, to produce such an inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the con-
sequence of the first draught. In such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed
propensity can no more be argued from his consequent constant practice, than from his
first draught? Or, suppose a young man, soberly inclined, enticed by wicked companions,
should drink to excess, until he had got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under
the power of a greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a
common and constant practice with him: and suppose an observer, arguing from this gen-
eral practice, should say, “It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclination to
that sin; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make such a trade of it?” And
another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing, should reply, “Do you tell me how it came
to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell
you how he is guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature
by being general: and therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at all times
by the same means that it came at first.” I leave it to every one to judge, who would be
chargeable with weak arguing in such a case.
It is true, there is no effect without some cause, ground, or reason of that effect, and
some cause answerable to the effect. But certainly it will not follow, that a transient effect
requires a permanent cause, or a fixed propensity. An effect happening once, though great,
yea, though it may come to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same time,
will not prove any fixed propensity, or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence
great and extensive, answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual; but it proves
nothing in the cause fixed or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees standing
together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season—or if the fruit be very
much blasted, and entirely spoiled—it is evident that something was the occasion of such
an effect at that time; but this alone does not prove the nature of the tree to be bad. But if it
be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all
soils, countries, climates, and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill
fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the tree.
And if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature of
the tree to be very bad. If we argue, in like manner, from what appears among men, it is
easy to determine, whether the universal sinfulness of mankind—all sinning immediately,
as soon as capable of it, and continually and generally being of a wicked character, at all
times, in all ages, in all places, and under all possible circumstances, against means and
996
SECTION IX. Several evasions considered.