principle of action? For such a liberty, this author supposes, that must be which is opposed
to moral necessity, as I have already observed.
Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement,
principle, or end, is it a dictate of invincible natural sense, that his act is more meritorious
or praiseworthy, than if he had performed it for some good end, and had been governed in
it by good principles and natives? and so I might ask, on the contrary, with respect to evil
actions. 184
The author of the Essays supposes that the liberty without necessity of which we have
a natural feeling, implies contingence; and, speaking of this contingence, be sometimes calls
it by the name of chance. And it is evident, that his notion of it, or rather what he says about
it, implies things happening loosely, fortuitously, by accident, and without a cause. 185 Now
I conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy any one, that such a contingence
of men’s actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the morality
or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it; and that, on the contrary, the dependence
of our actions on such causes, as inward inclinations, incitements, and ends, is essential to
the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when they see any thing done by others of a good
or evil tendency, to inquire what their intention was, what principles and views they were
moved by, in order to judge low far they are to be justified or condemned; and not to de-
termine, that, in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be performed
altogether fortuitously, proceeding from nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this
matter, I have fully expressed my mind in the Inquiry.
If the liberty of which we have a natural sense, as necessary to desert, consists in the
mind’s self-determination, without being determined by previous inclinations or motive,
then indifference is essential to it, yea absolute indifference; as is observed in my Inquiry.
But men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this, as essential to the morality or
demerit of their actions; but on the contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be in-
consistent with our natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the Inquiry. 186 If it be
agreeable to natural sense, that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions;
then, according to the same, the more they are determined by inclination, either good or
bad, the less they have of desert: the more good actions are performed from good disposition,
the less praiseworthy; and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpable;
and, in general, the more men’s actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be com-
mended or condemned: which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.
184 See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry. Part IV. Sect. 4.
185 P. 156-159, Sect. 6 and 7.
186 Especially in Part III.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…