the first choice from which holiness proceeds, can have no virtue at all, because, by the
supposition, it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence, if it be essential
to holiness that it proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice; unless the
first holy choice can be before itself.
And with respect to Adam, let us consider how upon Dr. T.‘s principles, it was possible
he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein
God created him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any benevolence in his
heart. For if so, there would have been original righteousness; there would have been genuine
moral rectitude; nothing would have been wanting: for our author says, True, genuine moral
rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single principle. But if he were wholly
without any such thing as love to God, or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue?
The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice: he must first choose to be virtuous. But what
if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle,
that he chose it; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart. And if he
chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his
choice; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he
say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice,
that are not virtuous? But this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the
cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way that can possibly
be devised, in consistence with Dr. T.‘s scheme, in which Adam ever could have any right-
eousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous
act.
These confused inconsistent assertions, concerning virtue and moral rectitude, arise
from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning freedom of will, as if it consisted in the will’s
self-determining power, supposed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue, and vice. The ab-
surdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these
matters, with its evidences, I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered, in
my ”Inquiry’’ on that subject; to which I must refer the reader, who desires further satisfaction,
and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.
Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr. T. against
original righteousness; I proceed to the proofs of the doctrine. And, in the first place, I would
consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first chapters of Genesis: or,
whether the history there delivered does not lead us to suppose, that our first parents were
created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness.
I. This history leads us to suppose, that Adam’s sin, with relation to the forbidden fruit,
was the first sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then,
been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence; and consequently,
created or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations,
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SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.