But if, because substances underlie these things, you think that the builders make them
out of what does exist, you are mistaken in your calculation. For it is not the substance which
makes the city or the temples, but art applied to substance. And this art is not produced out
of some art which lies in the substances themselves, but from that which is not in them.
But you seem likely to meet me with this argument: that the artificer makes the art which
is connected with the substance out of the art which he has. Now I think it is a good reply
to this to say, that in man it is not produced from any art lying beneath; for it is not to be
granted that substance by itself is art. For art is in the class of accidents, and is one of the
things that have an existence only when they are employed about some substance. For man
will exist even without the art of building, but it will have no existence unless man be previ-
ously in being. Whence we must say that it is in the nature of things for arts to be produced
in men out of what has no existence. If, then, we have shown that this is so in the case of
men, why was it improper to say that God is able to make not only qualities, but also sub-
stances, out of that which has no existence? For as it appears possible for something to be
produced out of what exists not, it is evident that this is the case with substances. To return
to the question of evil. Do you think evil comes under the head of substances, or of qualities
of substances?
Valentinian. Of qualities.
Orthodoxus. But matter was found to be without quality or form?
Valentinian. It was.
Orthodoxus. Well, then, the connection of these names with substance is owing to its
accidents. For murder is not a substance, nor is any other evil; but the substance receives a
cognate name from putting it into practice. For a man is not (spoken of as) murder, but by
committing it he receives the derived name of murderer, without being himself murder;
and, to speak concisely, no other evil is a substance; but by practising any evil, it can be
called evil. Similarly consider, if you imagine anything else to be the cause of evil to men,
that it too is evil by reason of its acting by them, and suggesting the committal of evil. For
a man is evil in consequence of his actions. For he is said to be evil, because he is the doer
of evil. Now what a man does, is not the man himself, but his activity, and it is from his ac-
tions that he receives the title of evil. For if we were to say that he is that which he does, and
he commits murders, adulteries, and such-like, he will be all these. Now if he is these, then
when they are produced he has an existence, but when they are not, he too ceases to be.
Now these things are produced by men. Men then will be the authors of them, and the causes
of their existing or not existing. But if each man is evil in consequence of what he practises,
and what he practises has an origin, he also made a beginning in evil, and evil too had a
beginning. Now if this is the case, no one is without a beginning in evil, nor are evil things
without an origin.
817
Concerning Free-Will.