not ordinarily called affections. Yet, what are commonly called affections are not essentially
different from them, but only in the degree and manner of exercise. In every act of the will
whatsoever, the soul either likes or dislikes, is either inclined or disinclined to what is in
view. These are not essentially different from the affections of love and hatred. A liking or
inclination of the soul to a thing, if it be in a high degree vigorous and lively, is the very
same thing with the affection of love: and a disliking and disinclining, if in a great degree,
is the very same with hatred. In every act of the will for or towards something not present,
the soul is in some degree inclined to that thing; and that inclination, if in a considerable
degree, is the very same with the affection of desire. And in every degree of an act of the will,
wherein the soul approves of something present, there is a degree of pleasedness; and that
pleasedness, if it be in a considerable degree, is the very same with the affection of joy or
delight. And if the will disapproves of what is present, the soul is in some degree displeased,
and if that displeasedness be great, it is the very same with the affection of grief or sorrow.
Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there
never is in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the inclination, without
some effect upon the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of
the animal spirits.—And, on the other hand, from the same laws of union, over the consti-
tution of the body, and the motion of its fluids, may promote the exercise of the affections.
But yet, it is not the body, but the mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections. The
body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow,
fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of man is capable of thinking
and understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased
or displeased with its ideas. As it is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves
or hates, rejoices or is grieved at, what it thinks of. Nor are these motions of the animal
spirits, and fluids of the body, any thing properly belonging to the nature of the affections;
though they always accompany them, in the present state; but are only effects or concomitants
of the affections, which are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way es-
sential to them; so that an unbodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow,
hope or fear, or other affections, as one that is united to a body.
The affections and passions are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet, in the more
common use of speech, there is in some respect a difference. Affection is a word, that, in its
ordinary signification, seems to be something more extensive than passion, being used for
all vigorous lively actings of the will or inclination; but passion is used for those that are
more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, the mind being more
overpowered, and less in its own command.
As all the exercises of inclination and will, are concerned either in approving and liking,
or disapproving and rejecting; so the affections are of two sorts; they are those by which the
soul is carried out to what is in view, cleaving to it, or seeking it; or those by which it is averse
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SECTION I. Previous remarks on the affections.