SECT. XV.
Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,
in a Letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland. 163
Rev. Sir,
The intimations you have given me of the use which has by some been made of what I
have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to vindicate what is said on the subject of
liberty and necessity, by the author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural
Religion, has occasioned my reading this author’s Essay on that subject with particular care
and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his Essay and
my Inquiry, that our schemes are exceedingly different from each other. The wide difference
appears particularly in the following things.
This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all men’s actions,
as is inconsistent with liberty, 164 and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting.
Thus, (p. 168.) after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected
with motives, he concludes with saying, “In short, if motives are not under our power or
direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have—no liberty.” Whereas, I have
abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty: and
that the moral necessity which universally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with
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any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or
that can possibly exist or be conceived of.
I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men’s volitions,
which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty denied; that though it be true
I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the Will, and
a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold a higher sort of freedom than I do: but I think
this is certainly a great mistake.
Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has
to do as he pleases, or conducting himself, in any respect, according to his pleasure; without
considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been
demonstrated, that no necessity of men’s volitions that I maintain, is inconsistent with this
liberty: and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty
than this: If any imagine they desire, and that they conceive of, a higher and greater liberty
than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words, instead
of ideas. If any one should here say, “Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the
liberty a man has of conducting himself in any respect as he pleases, viz. a liberty of choosing
as he pleases.” Such an one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own proposal.
163 The “Essays” to which this Appendix relates, were the production of Lord Kaimes.
164 P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.
SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, in a Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…