the agent being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more.
And if good inclination, or motive, has but little influence in determining the agent, they
do not think his act so much the more virtuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts,
which are determined by evil motives or inclinations.
Yea, if it be supposed, that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men,
by nature itself, (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not
commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no Praise or Dispraise for such dispositions;
although what is natural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the Will
whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious dispos-
ition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of
the common sense and apprehension of men, that such dispositions are no vices or moral
evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour; or that
the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no
resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly
be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts, that come from such a fountain,
than an extenuation of them. It being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men
in the height of their indignation: they will say, “It is his very nature: he is of a vile natural
temper; it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe; he cannot help serving the devil,”
&c. But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the subjects or
occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity,
by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse.—Thus it is very plain,
that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the
judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men’s actions.
And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted
whether the Arminians themselves have ever got rid of them; yea, their greatest doctors,
that have gone furthest in defence of their metaphysical notions of liberty, and have brought
their arguments to their greatest strength, and as they suppose, to a demonstration, against
the consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity: it is to be questioned, whether there
is so much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a
man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not,
from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as great suf-
ferings came upon him from the wind that blows and the fire that burns by natural necessity;
and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly
delirious; yea, though he first brought his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.
Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between natural and moral Necessity,
as though it were altogether impertinent in this controversy; “that which is necessary, say
they, is necessary; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is im-
possible, is impossible, and cannot be done; and, therefore, none can be to blame for not
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SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of…