larger than the objects placed before them, be they ever so small; but in small mirrors, such
as the pupil of the eye, although a large surface be placed over against them, a very small
image is formed, proportioned to the size of the mirror.1447 Therefore if the mirrors be re-
duced in size, the images reflected in them are also reduced; but it is not possible for the
images to be enlarged by enlarging the mirrors. Surely there is in this something which
might reward further investigation; but meanwhile, I must sleep.1448 Moreover, if I seem
to Nebridius to be happy, it is not because I seek, but because perchance I have found
something. What, then, is that something? Is it that chain of reasoning which I am wont so
to caress as if it were my sole treasure, and in which perhaps I take too much delight?
4. “Of what parts do we consist?” “Of soul and body.” “Which of these is the nobler?”
“Doubtless the soul.” “What do men praise in the body?” “Nothing that I see but comeliness.”
“And what is comeliness of body?” “Harmony of parts in the form, together with a certain
agreeableness of colour.” “Is this comeliness better where it is true or where it is illusive?”
“Unquestionably it is better where it is true.” “And where is it found true? In the soul.” “The
soul, therefore, is to be loved more than the body; but in what part of the soul does this truth
reside?” “In the mind and understanding.” “With what has the understanding to contend?”
“With the senses.” “Must we then resist the senses with all our might?” “Certainly.” “What,
then, if the things with which the senses acquaint us give us pleasure?” “We must prevent
222
them from doing so.” “How?” “By acquiring the habit of doing without them, and desiring
better things.” “But if the soul die, what then?” “Why, then truth dies, or intelligence is not
truth, or intelligence is not a part of the soul, or that which has some part immortal is liable
to die: conclusions all of which I demonstrated long ago in my Soliloquies to be absurd be-
cause impossible; and I am firmly persuaded that this is the case, but somehow through the
influence of custom in the experience of evils we are terrified, and hesitate. But even granting,
finally, that the soul dies, which I do not see to be in any way possible, it remains nevertheless
true that a happy life does not consist in the evanescent joy which sensible objects can yield:
this I have pondered deliberately, and proved.”
Perhaps it is on account of reasonings such as these that I have been judged by my own
Nebridius to be, if not absolutely happy, at least in a sense happy. Let me also judge myself
to be happy: for what do I lose thereby, or why should I grudge to think well of my own estate?
Thus I talked with myself, then prayed according to my custom, and fell asleep.
5. These things I have thought good to write to you. For it gratifies me that you should
thank me when I write freely to you whatever crosses my mind; and to whom can I more
willingly write nonsense1449 than to one whom I cannot displease? But if it depends upon
1447 Augustin’s acquaintance with the first principles of optics, and with the properties of reflection possessed
by convex, plane, and concave mirrors, was very limited.
1448 Wisely resolved.
1449 Ineptiam.
517
To Nebridius