238 ON THE TEINITY. [cOOK IX.
were answers, upon being questioned, in a way more familiar
to ourselves, we may be able to direct a more practised men-
tal vision from the enlightened creature to the unchangeable
light ; assuming, however, that the truth itself has persuaded
us, that as no Christian doubts the Word of God to be the
Son, so that the Holy Spirit is love. Let us return, then, to a
more careful questioning and consideration upon this subject
of that image which is the creature, that is, of the rational
mind; wherein the knowledge of some things coming into
existence in time, but which did not exist before, and the love
of some things which were not loved before, opens to us
more clearly what to say : because to speech also itself, which
must be disposed in time, that thing is easier of explanation
which is comprehended in the order of time.
18. First, therefore, it is clear that a thing may possibly be
knowable, that is, such as can be known, and yet that itmay be
unknown ; but that it is not possible for that to be known
which is not knowable. Wherefore itmust be clearly held that
everything whatsoever that we know begets at the same time
in us the knowledge of itself; for knowledge is brought forth
from both, from the knower and from the thing known.
When, therefore, the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent
of its own knowledge; for it is itself both the thing known and
the knower of it. But it was knowable to itself also before
it knew itself, only the knowledge of itself was not in itself
so long as it did not know itself In knowing itself, then, it
begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself ; since it does not
know itself as less than itself is, nor is its knowledge theknow-
ledge of the essence of some one else, not only because itself
knows, but also because it knows itself, as we have said above.
What then is to be said of love ; why, when the mind loves
itself, it should not seem also to have begotten the love of
itself? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved
itself, since it could love itself; just as it was knowable to
itself even before it knew itself, since it could know itself.
For if it were not knowable to itself, it never could haveknown
itself; and so, if it were not lovable to itself, it never could
have loved itself. Why therefore may it not be said by lov-
ing itself to have begotten its own love, as by knowing itself