what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body; how, being intangible and
without form, it is kept within its own sphere, what difference exists among its powers, how
one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to know the things which are unseen, soars
above the highest heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back
on material passions, anger and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory,
cowardice and audacity, friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in
the faculties of the soul? Observing which things, who has not fancied that he has a sort of
populace of souls crowded together in himself, each of the aforesaid passions differing widely
from the rest, and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so that even the rational
faculty falls under and is subject to the predominating power of such forces, and contributes
its own co-operation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? What word, then, of the inspired
Scripture has taught us the manifold and multiform character of what we understand in
speaking of the soul? Is it a unity composed of them all, and, if so, what is it that blends and
harmonizes things mutually opposed, so that many things become one, while each element,
taken by itself, is shut up in the soul as in some ample vessel? And how is it that we have
not the perception of them all as being involved in it, being at one and the same time con-
fident and afraid, at once hating and loving and feeling in ourselves the working as well of
all other emotions confused and intermingled; but, on the contrary, take knowledge only
of their alternate control, when one of them prevails, the rest remaining quiescent? What
in short is this composition and arrangement, and this capacious void within us, such that
to each is assigned its own post, as though hindered by middle walls of partition from
holding intercourse with its neighbour? And then again what account has explained
whether passion is the fundamental essence of the soul, or fear, or any of the other elements
which I have mentioned; and what emotions are unsubstantial? For if these have an inde-
pendent subsistence, then, as I have said, there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul,
but a collection of souls, each of them occupying its distinct position as a particular and
individual soul. But if we must suppose these to be a kind of emotion without subsistence,
how can that which has no essential existence exercise lordship over us, having reduced us
as it were to slave under whichsoever of these things may have happened to prevail? And if
the soul is something that thought only can grasp, how can that which is manifold and
composite be contemplated as such, when such an object ought to be contemplated by itself,
independently of these bodily qualities? Then, as to the soul’s power of growth, of desire,
of nutrition, of change, and the fact that all the bodily powers are nourished, while feeling
does not extend through all, but, as in things without life, some of our members are destitute
of feeling, the bones for example, the cartilages, the nails, the hair, all of which take nourish-
ment, but do not feel,—tell me who is there that understands this only half-complete oper-
ation of the soul as to these? And why do I speak of the soul? Even the inquiry as to that
thing in the flesh itself which assumes all the corporeal qualities has not been pursued to
496
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.