On this ground he says that the
Maker of time must commence His existence from a like beginning. Well,
the creation has the ages for its beginning, but what beginning can you
conceive of the Maker of the ages? If any one should say, “The
‘beginning’ which is mentioned in the
Gospel”—it is the Father Who is there signified, and the
confession of the Son together with Him is there pointed to, nor can it
be that He Who is in the Father S. John xiv. 10, as the Lord says,
can begin His being in Him from any particular point. And if any one
speaks of another beginning besides this, let him tell us the name by
which he marks this beginning, as none can be apprehended before the
establishment of the ages. Such a statement, therefore, will not move
us a whit from the orthodox conception concerning the Only-begotten,
even if old women do applaud the proposition as a sound one. For we
abide by what has been determined from the beginning, having our
doctrine firmly based on truth, to wit, that all things which the
orthodox doctrine assumes that we assert concerning the Only-begotten
God have no kindred with the creation, but the marks which distinguish
the Maker of all and His works are separated by a wide interval. If
indeed the Son had in any other respect communion with the creation, we
surely ought to say that He did not diverge from it even in the manner
of His existence. But if the creation has no share in such things as
are all those which we learn concerning the Son, we must surely of
necessity say that in this matter also He has no communion with it. For
the creation was not in the beginning, and was not with God, and was
not, God, nor life, nor light, nor resurrection, nor the rest of the
Divine names, as truth, righteousness, sanctification, Judge, just,
Maker of all things, existing before the ages, for ever and ever; the
creation is not the brightness of the glory, nor the express image of
the Person, nor the likeness of goodness, nor grace, nor power, nor
truth, nor salvation, nor redemption; nor do we find any one at all of
those names which are employed by Scripture for the glory of the
Only-begotten, either belonging to the creation or employed concerning
it,—not to speak of those more exalted words, “I am in the
Father, and the Father in Me S. John xiv. 10,” and,
“He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father S. John xiv. 9,” and, “None hath seen the Son,
save the Father Apparently an inexact quotation of S. Matt. xi. 27..” If indeed our
doctrine allowed us to claim for the creation things so many and so
great as these, he might have been right in thinking that we ought to
attach what we observe in it to our conceptions of the Only-begotten
also, since
the transfer would be from kindred subjects to one nearly allied. But
if all these concepts and names involve communion with the Father,
while they transcend our notions of the creation, does not our clever
and sharp-witted friend slink away in shame at discussing the nature of
the Lord of the Creation by the aid of what he observes in creation,
without being aware that the marks which distinguish the creation are
of a different sort? The ultimate division of all that exists is made
by the line between “created” and “uncreated,”
the one being regarded as a cause of what has come into being, the
other as coming into being thereby. Now the created nature and the
Divine essence being thus divided, and admitting no intermixture in
respect of their distinguishing properties, we must by no means
conceive both by means of similar terms, nor seek in the idea of their
nature for the same distinguishing marks in things that are thus
separated. Accordingly, as the nature that is in the creation, as the
phrase of the most excellent Wisdom somewhere tells us, exhibits
“the beginning, ending, and midst of the times Wisd. vii. 18.” in itself, and extends concurrently
with all temporal intervals, we take as a sort of characteristic of the
subject this property, that in it we see some beginning of its
formation, look on its midst, and extend our expectations to its end.
For we have learnt that the heaven and the earth were not from
eternity, and will not last to eternity, and thus it is hence clear
that those things are both started from some beginning, and will surely
cease at some end. But the Divine Nature, being limited in no respect,
but passing all limitations on every side in its infinity, is far
removed from those marks which we find in creation. For that power
which is without interval, without quantity, without circumscription,
having in itself all the ages and all the creation that has taken place
in them, and over-passing at all points, by virtue of the infinity of
its own nature, the unmeasured extent of the ages, either has no mark
which indicates its nature, or has one of an entirely different sort,
and not that which the creation has. Since, then, it belongs to the
creation to have a beginning, that will be alien from the uncreated
nature which belongs to the creation. For if any one should venture to
suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to be, like the
creation, from any beginning comprehensible by us, he must certainly
append to his statement concerning the Son the rest also of the
sequence That
is, he must also acknowledge a “middle” and an
“end” of the existence which has a
“beginning.”; for it is not possible to avoid
acknowledging, together with the beginning, that also which follows
from it. For just as if one were to admit some person to be a man in
all Oehler’s emendation, for which he gives weighty ms. authority, is certainly an improvement on the earlier
text, but in sense it is a little unsatisfactory. The argument seems to
require the hypothesis not of some one acknowledging a person to be a
man in all, but in some attributes. The defect, however,
may possibly be in S. Gregory’s argument, not in the
text. the properties of his nature, he would
observe that in this confession he declared him to be an animal and
rational, and whatever else is conceived of man, so by the same
reasoning, if we should understand any of the properties of creation to
be present in the Divine essence, it will no longer be open to us to
refrain from attaching to that pure Nature the rest of the list of the
attributes contemplated therein. For the “beginning” will
demand by force and compulsion that which follows it; for the
“beginning,” thus conceived, is a beginning of what comes
after it, in such a sense, that if they are, it is, and if the things
connected with it are removed, the antecedent also would not remain i.e.“if the ‘middle’
and ‘end’ are not admitted, at the ‘beginning,’
which is the ‘beginning’ of a sequence, is thereby
implicitly denied.” Oehler’s punctuation has been somewhat
altered here, and at several points in the remainder of the book, where
it appears to require emendation.. Now as the book of Wisdom speaks of
“midst” and “end” as well as of
“beginning,” if we assume in the Nature of the
Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma, some beginning of
existence defined by a certain mark of time, the book of Wisdom will by
no means allow us to refrain from subjoining to the
“beginning” a “midst” and an “end”
also. If this should be done we shall find, as the result of our
arguments, that the Divine word shows us that the Deity is mortal. For
if, according to the book of Wisdom, the “end” is a
necessary consequence of the “beginning,” and the idea of
“midst” is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one
of these also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of
measure and limitation for the infinite Nature. And if this is impious
and absurd, the giving a beginning to that argument which ends in
impiety deserves equal, or even greater censure; and the beginning of
this absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of
the Son was circumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is
before them: either they must revert to sound doctrine under the
compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate Him Who is of
the Father in union with the Father’s eternity, or if they do not
like this, they must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and
reduce the limitless character of His life to non-existence by a
beginning and an end. And, granted that the nature both of souls and of
the angels has no end, and is no way hindered from going on to
eternity, by the fact of its being created, and having the
beginning
of its existence from some point of time, so that our adversaries can
use this fact to assert a parallel in the case of Christ, in the sense
that He is not from eternity, and yet endures everlastingly,—let
any one who advances this argument also consider the following point,
how widely the Godhead differs from the creation in its special
attributes. For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no
conceivable thing which is regarded as good, while the creation attains
excellence by partaking in something better than itself; and further,
not only had a beginning of its being, but also is found to be
constantly in a state of beginning to be in excellence, by its
continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at what it has
reached, but all that it has acquired Reading κτηθὲν,
with the Paris ed. of 1638. Oehler’s reading κτισθὲν
hardly seems to give so good a sense, and he does not
give his authority for it. becomes by
participation a beginning of its ascent to something still greater, and
it never ceases, in Paul’s phrase, “reaching forth to the
things that are before,” and “forgetting the things that
are behind Phil. iii. 13..” Since, then, the Godhead is
very life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and life, and truth, and
every conceivable thing that is lofty and Divine, while the creation
draws from Him its supply of good, it may hence be evident that if it
is in life by partaking of life, it will surely, if it ceases from this
participation, cease from life also. If they dare, then, to say also of
the Only-begotten God those things which it is true to say of the
creation, let them say this too, along with the rest, that He has a
beginning of His being like the creation, and abides in life after the
likeness of souls. But if He is the very life, and needs not to have
life in Himself ab extra, while all other things are not life,
but are merely participants in life, what constrains us to cancel, by
reason of what we see in creation, the eternity of the Son? For that
which is always unchanged as regards its nature, admits of no contrary,
and is incapable of change to any other condition: while things whose
nature is on the boundary line have a tendency that shifts either way,
inclining at will to what they find attractive Reading
with Oehler, τοῖς κατὰ
γνώμην
προσκλινομένη. The reading προσκινουμένοις, found in the earlier editions, gives a tolerable sense,
but appears to have no ms.
authority.. If,
then, that which is truly life is contemplated in the Divine and
transcendent nature, the decadence thereof will surely, as it seems,
end in the opposite state Or
(if πάντως be
constructed with ἀντικείμενον), “will end, as it seems, in that state which is
absolutely opposed to life.”.