exposition of the absurdity which he is opposing; 89 that he stood forth as the champion of
truth, and the opponent of error; and that, in this character, it was his duty not merely to
prostrate error, but to give it a death-blow, that it might never rise again.
But the characteristic of his controversial, and indeed of all his theological, writings,
which gives them their chief value and effect, is the unanswerableness of his arguments. He
not only drives his enemy from the field, but he erects a rampart, so strong and impregnable,
89 Few men have possessed a greater fund of genuine wit, than Mr. Edwards. In early life, he found it difficult
to restrain it. The clear reductio ad absurdum, to which he subjects every scheme and argument of his antagonists,
in the Freedom of the Will, is usually a brilliant example of true logical wit. The Answer to Williams abounds
with it. I doubt whether the annals of metaphysics can show a finer specimen of it, than the following; which is
the conclusion of his exposure of the metaphysical notion of an action or act, as defined by Chubb, and his as-
sociates: “So that, according to their notion of an act, considered with regard to its consequences, these following
things are all essential to it: viz. That it should be necessary and yet not necessary; that it should be from a cause
and yet from no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and yet not the fruit of choice and design;
that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should
be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of
preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is what
the mind causes itself of its own will, and can produce or prevent according to its choice or pleasure, and yet
what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair. “So that an act according
to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the
mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: 1
There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description,
according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And, 2. There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion
or idea to answer the word as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many
ways destroy itself. But it is impossible that any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature
and essence, which constitutes it, destroys it. — If some learned philosopher, who has been abroad, in giving
an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, ’ He has been in Terra del Fuego,
and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth himself, and yet
had a sire and dam distinct from himself: that he had an appetite, and was hungry, before he had a being: that
his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him
where he pleased: that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step: that he went with his head
first, and yet always went tail foremost, and this, though he had neither head nor tail:’ it would be no impudence
at all to tell such a traveller, though a man of profound learning, that he himself had no idea of such an animal
as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.”
404
CHAPTER XXV. Concluding remarks