without their knowing what they say, as the saving Passion of the Lord for us had been
foretold in the case of Caiaphas, not knowing what he said647. If, therefore, true propriety
of essence is common to both (I mean to the Father and the Son), what room is there for
saying that their essences are mutually divergent? Or how is a difference by way of superior
power, or greatness, or honour, contemplated in them, seeing that the “most proper” essence
admits of no diminution? For that which is whatever it is imperfectly, is not that thing “most
properly,” be it nature, or power, or rank, or any other individual object of contemplation,
so that the superiority of the Father’s essence, as heresy will have it, proves the imperfection
of the essence of the Son. If then it is imperfect, it is not proper; but if it is “most proper” it
is also surely perfect. For it is not possible to call that which is deficient perfect. But neither
is it possible, when, in comparing them, that which is perfect is set beside that which is
perfect, to perceive any difference by way of excess or defect: for perfection is one in both
cases, as in a rule, not showing a hollow by defect, nor a projection by excess. Thus, from
these passages Eunomius’ advocacy in favour of our doctrine may be sufficiently seen—I
should rather say, not his earnestness on our behalf, but his conflict with himself. For he
turns against himself those devices whereby he establishes our doctrines by his own argu-
ments. Let us, however, once more follow his writings word for word, that it may be clear
to all that their argument has no power for evil except the desire to do mischief.
647 S. John xi. 51
311
He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of an advocate…