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gically, how absurdly foolish it is, or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same
argument as that whereby he establishes this union of the perishable and the unbeginning,
he can make sport of any proper and worthily conceived name for the Deity. For it is not
these two ideas only that we associate with the Divine Life, I mean, the being without begin-
ning, and the not admitting of dissolution; but It is called as well immaterial and without
anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just; and there are
numberless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each one of which is announced
by an expressive sound with a peculiar meaning of its own. Well, to any name—any name,
I mean, expressive of some proper conception of the Deity—it is open for us to apply this
method of unnatural union devised by Eunomius. For instance, immateriality and absence
of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life; but not with the same thought in both cases;
for by the term immaterial we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and
by the term “without anger” the strangeness to any emotion of anger. Now in all probability
Eunomius will run trippingly over all this, and have his dance, just as before, upon our
words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: “If wherein He is
separated from all mixture with matter He is called immaterial, in this respect He will not
be without anger; and if by reason of His not indulging in anger He is without anger, it is
impossible to attribute to him immateriality, but logic will compel us to admit that, in so
far as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful;” and so you will find
the same to be the case in respect to his other attributes. And if you like we will propound
another pairing of the same, i.e. His immutability and His incorporeality. For both these
terms being used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case also Eunomius’ skill will
embellish the same absurdity. For if His being always as He is is signified by the term im-
mutable, and if the term incorporeal represents the spirituality of His essence, Eunomius
will certainly say the same here also, that the terms are irreconcilable, and alien to each
other, and that the notions which our minds attach to them have no point of contact one
with the other; for insofar as God is always the same He is immutable, but not incorporeal;
and in regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His essence, while He possesses attributes
of incorporeality, He is not immutable; so that it happens that when immutability is con-
sidered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It
is corporeal; but if spirituality is the object of search, you prove that It is at once incorporeal
and mutable.
Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to
go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in every instance you may see an
attempt to establish the same futility. For instance, by an implication such as that above,
what is true and what is just will be found opposed to each other; for there is a difference
in meaning between truth and justice. So that by a parity of reasoning Eunomius will say
about these also, that truth is not injustice, and that justice is absent from truth; and it will
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.