They say that God is ungenerate,
and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine
essence, here we take exception. For we maintain that this term is
declarative of God’s ungenerate subsistence, but not that
ungeneracy is God. But of what nature is his refutation? It is this:
that before man’s creation God existed ungenerately. But what has
this to do with the point which he promises to establish, that the term
and its Subject are identical? For he lays it down that ungeneracy is
the Divine essence. But what sort of a fulfilment of his promise is it,
to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What a
wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! what perfection of
logical refinement! Who that has not been initiated in the mysteries of
the awful craft may venture to look it in the face? Yet in
particularizing the meanings of the term “conception,” he
makes a solemn travesty of it. For, saith he, of words used to express
a conception of the mind, some exist only in pronunciation, as for
instance those which signify nonentity, while others have their
peculiar meaning; and of these some have an amplifying force, as in the
case of things colossal, others a diminishing, as in that of pigmies,
others a multiplying, as in that of many-headed monsters, others a
combinative, as in that of centaurs. After thus reducing the force of
the term “conception” to its lowest value, our clever
friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. He says that it is without
sense and meaning, that it fancies the unnatural, either contracting or
extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions
together, or juggling with strange and monstrous
combinations.