real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their
cause. These effects and images having already had actual existence, render that matter of
their existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise; and this
proves, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is
also equally sure, firm, and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be,
as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we sup-
pose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed
there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with
their cause, the case is not altered.
Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the force of what is
urged from God’s Prescience, against the continuance of the volitions of moral agents, is to
this purpose; “That when we talk of Foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in
our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect Knowledge
of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God,
but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.”—To this
I answer,
1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge proves the Necessity of the
truth known; whether it be before, after, or at the same time.—Though it be true, that there
is no succession in God’s Knowledge, and the manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable,
yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that
God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible
Knowledge of it; he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always
sees things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in
such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no
Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are future to us, are as present to
God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are
always in God’s view as evident, clear, sure, and necessary, as if they already were. If there
never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never
is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence
were present, and were already come to pass.
God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that there is no succession in his
ideas or judgment, does not hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a
certain and perfect Knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred
years hence: yea the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but
that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions should not come
to pass.
We know, that God foreknows the future voluntary actions of men, in such a sense, as
that he is able particularly to foretell them, and cause them to be recorded, as he often has
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…