gent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may
never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be; and that
is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and
that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing
it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all Necessity,
then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily
that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake; because it
would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and
all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have
ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so,
as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know; or that he may
know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot
conceive how; because he has ways of knowing which we cannot comprehend.
Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are
no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which
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follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion
between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between
the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree
should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The
connexion between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition:
because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely
perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connexion,
between the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added
to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible
and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the
addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the Knowledge is
absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.
There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should
be, or, which is the same thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the event
were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding
ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connexion possible between the writing
and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of exist-
ence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary
than this.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then
Necessity of connexion and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which
man, or any other creature, enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees,
which do not at all increase the Necessity, are not inconsistent with the liberty which man
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…