generated and the non-generated the variation of the natures, it is readily seen what must
result: viz., that, as in following out the opposition of the names, the nature of the things
which those names indicate must be considered to be in a state of contrariety to itself, there
is every necessity that the qualities observed in each should be drawn out opposite each
other; so that those qualities should be applied to the Son which are the reverse of those
predicated of the Father, viz., of divinity, holiness, goodness, imperishability, eternity, and
of every other quality that represents God to the devout mind; in fact, every negation183 of
these, every conception that ranks opposite to the good, must be considered as belonging
to the generated nature.
To ensure clearness, we must dwell upon this point. As the peculiar phænomena of heat
and cold—which are themselves by nature opposed to each other (let us take fire and ice as
examples of each), each being that which the other is not—are at variance with each other,
cooling being the peculiarity of ice, heating of fire; so if in accordance with the antithesis
expressed by the names, the nature revealed by those names is parted asunder, it is not to
be admitted that the faculties attending these natural “subcontraries184” are like each other,
any more than cooling can belong to fire, or burning to ice. If, then, goodness is inseparable
from the idea of the non-generated nature, and that nature is parted on the ground of being,
as they declare, from the generated nature, the properties of the former will be parted as
well from those of the latter: so that if the good is found in the first, the quality set against
the good is to be perceived in the last. Thus, thanks to our clever systematizers, Manes lives
again with his parallel line of evil in array over against the good, and his theory of opposite
powers residing in opposite natures.
Indeed, if we are to speak the truth boldly, without any reserve, Manes, who for having
been the first, they say, to venture to entertain the Manichæan view, gave his name to that
heresy, may fairly be considered the less offensive of the two. I say this, just as if one had to
choose between a viper and an asp for the most affection towards man; still, if we consider,
there is some difference between brutes185. Does not a comparison of doctrines show that
those older heretics are less intolerable than these? Manes thought he was pleading on the
side of the Origin of Good, when he represented that Evil could derive thence none of its
causes; so he linked the chain of things which are on the list of the bad to a separate Principle,
in his character of the Almighty’s champion, and in his pious aversion to put the blame of
any unjustifiable aberrations upon that Source of Good; not perceiving, with his narrow
understanding, that it is impossible even to conceive of God as the fashioner of evil, or on
the other hand, of any other First Principle besides Him. There might be a long discussion
183 ἀπεμφαίνοντα
184 ὑπεναντίων
185 πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ ἐν θηριοις κρίοις.
158
Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.