round to the other class, and says: “But to the wedded I make official declaration—not indeed
I, but the Lord.” Thus he shows, by the transfer of his own personality to the Lord, that
what he had said above he had pronounced not in the Lord’s person, but in his own: “Better
it is to marry than to burn.” Now, although that expression pertain to such as are “appre-
hended” by the faith in an unwedded or widowed condition, still, inasmuch as all cling to it
with a view to licence in the way of marrying, I should wish to give a thorough treatment
to the inquiry what kind of good he is pointing out which is “better than” a penalty; which
cannot seem good but by comparison with something very bad; so that the reason why
“marrying” is good, is that “burning” is worse. “Good” is worthy of the name if it continue
to keep that name without comparison, I say not with evil, but even with some second good;
so that, even if it is compared to some other good, and is by some other cast into the shade,
it do nevertheless remain in possession of the name “good.” If, however, it is the nature of
an evil which is the means which compels the predicating “good,” it is not so much “good”
as a species of inferior evil, which by being obscured by a superior evil is driven to the name
of good. Take away, in short, the condition of comparison, so as not to say, “Better it is to
marry than to burn;” and I question whether you will have the hardihood to say, “Better it
is to marry,” not adding what that is which is better. Therefore what is not better, of course
is not good either; inasmuch as you have taken away and removed the condition of compar-
ison, which, while it makes the thing “better,” so compels it to be regarded as “good.”
“Better it is to marry than to burn” is to be understood in the same way as, “Better it is to
lack one eye than two:” if, however, you withdraw from the comparison, it will not be
“better” to have one eye, inasmuch as it is not “good” either. Let none therefore catch at a
defence (of marriage) from this paragraph, which properly refers to “the unmarried and
widows,” for whom no (matrimonial) conjunction is yet reckoned: although I hope I have
shown that even such must understand the nature of the permission.
116
Of Indulgence and Pure Volition. The Question Illustrated.