in consequence of, and according to its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not
by its activity produce all its own acts of will or choice themselves; for this, by the supposition,
is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily an electively or in consequence of its own
free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the forementioned contradiction, of
a free act of choice before the first free act of choice.—According to these gentlemen’s own
notion of action, if there arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the Will to produce
it, the mind is not the voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it does not arise from, nor
is regulated by, choice or design. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the
active, voluntary, determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the af-
fair.—The mind being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence
of its design; it will not enable it to be the designing Cause of all its own designs. The mind
being an elective Cause, will enable it to produce effects only in consequence of its elections,
and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the elective Cause of all its own elections;
because that supposes an election before the first election. So the mind being an active Cause
enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but cannot enable it to be the
determining Cause of all its own acts; for that is, in the same manner, a contradiction; as it
supposes a determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it, having a causal
influence on its existence, and manner of existence.
I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul having power to cause and
determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this;
that God has given power to the soul, sometimes at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure,
or according as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a choice preceding
all Volitions which are thus caused, even the first of them. Which runs into the forementioned
great absurdity.
Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties with
which the notion of a self-determining power in the Will is attended, nor will it help, in the
least, its absurdities and inconsistences.
557
SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity…