ought not on the one hand to be avoided, and it cannot be evaded on the other. It ought
not to be avoided, because it is good; for everything must be good on which God has cast
His eye. And with this idea has perhaps this statement been made in Genesis, “And God
saw because it is good;” not that He would have been ignorant of its goodness unless He
had seen it, but to indicate by this expression that it was good because it was viewed by God.
There are many events indeed happening by the will of God, and happening to somebody’s
harm. Yet for all that, a thing is therefore good because it is of God, as divine, as reasonable;
for what is divine, and not reasonable and good? What is good, yet not divine? But if to
the universal apprehension of mankind this seems to be the case, in judging, man’s faculty
of apprehension does not predetermine the nature of things, but the nature of things his
power of apprehension. For every several nature is a certain definite reality, and it lays it
on the perceptive power to perceive it just as it exists. Now, if that which comes from God
is good indeed in its natural state (for there is nothing from God which is not good, because
it is divine, and reasonable), but seems evil only to the human faculty, all will be right in
regard to the former; with the latter the fault will lie. In its real nature a very good thing is
chastity, and so is truth, and righteousness; and yet they are distasteful to many. Is perhaps
the real nature on this account sacrificed to the sense of perception? Thus persecution in
its own nature too is good, because it is a divine and reasonable appointment; but those to
whom it comes as a punishment do not feel it to be pleasant. You see that as proceeding
from Him, even that evil has a reasonable ground, when one in persecution is cast out of a
state of salvation, just as you see that you have a reasonable ground for the good also, when
one by persecution has his salvation made more secure. Unless, as it depends on the Lord,
one either perishes irrationally, or is irrationally saved, he will not be able to speak of perse-
cution as an evil, which, while it is under the direction of reason, is, even in respect of its
evil, good. So, if persecution is in every way a good, because it has a natural basis, we on
valid grounds lay it down, that what is good ought not to be shunned by us, because it is a
sin to refuse what is good; besides that, what has been looked upon by God can no longer
indeed be avoided, proceeding as it does from God, from whose will escape will not be
possible. Therefore those who think that they should flee, either reproach God with doing
what is evil, if they flee from persecution as an evil (for no one avoids what is good); or they
count themselves stronger than God: so they think, who imagine it possible to escape when
it is God’s pleasure that such events should occur.
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5. But, says some one, I flee, the thing it belongs to me to do, that I may not perish, if
I deny; it is for Him on His part, if He chooses, to bring me, when I flee, back before the
tribunal. First answer me this: Are you sure you will deny if you do not flee, or are you not
sure? For if you are sure, you have denied already, because by presupposing that you will
deny, you have given yourself up to that about which you have made such a presupposition;
and now it is vain for you to think of flight, that you may avoid denying, when in intention
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De Fuga in Persecutione.