LET. VII.] TO NEBRIDIUS.- 13 ceives some objects which the senses never perceived, whereby it is shown that it has a ll its images w ithin itself, and from itself. You w ill answer me what yon think o f this q^uestion also. LETTEH VII. (a.d. 389.) < t TO NEBEIDIUS AUGUSTINE SENDS GREETING. Chap. i.— Memory may te exercised independently of such images as arc presented by the imagination. 1. I S H A L L dispense with a formal preface, and to the subject on which you have for some time wished to hear my opinion I shall address myseK at once ; and this I do the more willingly, because the statement must take some time. I t seems to you that there can he no exercise of memory w ithout images, or the apprehension of some objects presented by the imagination, which you have been pleased to call " phantasia3.” For m y part, I entertain a . different opinion. In the first place, w e m ust observe that the things which we remenaber are not always things which are passing away, but are for the m ost pa!rt things which are permanent. W here­ fore, seeing that the function o f memory is to retain hold of what belongs to tim e past, it is certain that it embraces on the one hand things w hich leave us, and on the other hand things from w hich we go away. W hen, for example, I remember m y father, the object w hich memory recalls is one w hich has left me, and is now no m ore; but when I remember Carthage, the object is in th is case one w hich stiU exists, and which I have left. In both cases, however, memory retains what belongs to past tim a For I remember that man and this city, not b y seeing them now, but by having seen them in the past. 2. You perhaps ask me at th is point. W hy bring forward these facts ? And you m ay do th is the more readily, because you observe that in both th e . examples quoted th e object re­ membered can come to m y memory in no other w ay than by the apprel^ension of such an image as you affirm to be rJways