Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Epicurus, in placing happiness in not being hungry,
or thirsty, or cold, uttered that godlike word, saying impiously that
he would fight in these points even with Father Jove; teaching, as if
it were the case of pigs that live in filth and not that of rational
philosophers, that happiness was victory. For of those that are ruled by
pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epicurus; for these expressly said that
to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only
perfect good. Epicurus also says that the removal of pain is pleasure;
and says that that is to be preferred, which first attracts from itself
to itself, being, that is, wholly in motion. Dinomachus and Callipho said
that the chief end was for one to do what he could for the attainment
and enjoyment of pleasure; and Hieronymus the Peripatetic said the great
end was to live unmolested, and that the only final good was happiness;
and Diodorus likewise, who belonged to the same sect, pronounces the end
to be to live undisturbed and well. Epicurus indeed, and the Cyrenaics,
say that pleasure is the first duty; for it is for the sake of pleasure,
they say,
that virtue was introduced, and
produced pleasure. According to the followers of Calliphon, virtue was
introduced for the sake of pleasure, but that subsequently, on seeing
its own beauty, it made itself equally prized with the first principle,
that is, pleasure.
But the Aristotelians lay it down, that to live in
accordance with virtue is the end, but that neither happiness nor the
end is reached by every one who has virtue. For the wise man, vexed and
involved in involuntary mischances, and wishing gladly on these
accounts to flee from life, is neither fortunate nor happy. For virtue
needs time; for that is not acquired in one day which exists [only] in
the perfect man since, as they say, a child is never happy. But human
life is a perfect time, and therefore happiness is completed by the
three kinds of good things. Neither, then, the poor, nor the mean nor
even the diseased, nor the slave, can be one of them.
Again, on the other hand, Zeno the Stoic thinks the end
to be living according to virtue; and, Cleanthes, living agreeably to
nature in the right exercise of reason, which he held to consist of the
selection of things according to nature. And Antipatrus, his friend,
supposes the end to consist in choosing continually and unswervingly
the things which are according to nature, and rejecting those contrary
to nature. Archedamus, on the other hand, explained the end to be such,
that in selecting the greatest and chief things according to nature, it
was impossible to overstep it. In addition to these, Panætius
pronounced the end to be, to live according to the means given to us by
nature. And finally, Posidonius said that it was to live engaged in
contemplating the truth and order of the universe, and forming himself
as he best can, in nothing influenced by the irrational part of his
soul. And some of the later Stoics defined the great end to consist in
living agreeably to the constitution of man. Why should I mention
Aristo? He said that the end was indifference; but what is indifferent
simply abandons the indifferent. Shall I bring forward the opinions of
Herillus? Herillus states the end to be to live according to science.
For some think that the more recent disciples of the Academy define the
end to be, the steady abstraction of the mind to its own impressions.
Further, Lycus the Peripatetic used to say that the final end was the
true joy of the soul; as Leucimus, that it was the joy it had in what
was good. Critolaus, also a Peripatetic, said that it was the
perfection of a life flowing rightly according to nature, referring to
the perfection accomplished by the three kinds according to
tradition.
We must, however, not rest satisfied with
these, but endeavour as we best can to adduce the doctrines laid
down on the point by the naturalist; for they say that Anaxagoras of
Clazomenæ affirmed contemplation and the freedom flowing from
it to be the end of life; Heraclitus the Ephesian, complacency. The
Pontic Heraclides relates, that Pythagoras taught that the knowledge
of the perfection of the numbers
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was happiness of the
soul. The Abderites also teach the existence of an end. Democritus,
in his work
On the Chief End
, said it was cheerfulness, which
he also called well-being, and often exclaims, “For delight
and its absence are the boundary of those who have reached full
age;” Hecatæus, that it was sufficiency to one’s self;
Apollodotus of Cyzicum, that it was delectation; as Nausiphanes,
that it was undauntedness,
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for he said that it was this that was called by Democritus
imperturbability. In addition to these still, Diotimus declared
the end to be perfection of what is good, which he said was termed
well-being. Again, Antisthenes, that it was humility. And those called
Annicereans, of the Cyrenaic succession, laid down no definite end for
the whole of life; but said that to each action belonged, as its proper
end, the pleasure accruing from the action. These Cyrenaics reject
Epicurus’ definition of pleasure, that is the removal of pain,
calling that the condition of a dead man; because we rejoice not only
on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while
Epicurus thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations
of the flesh. Metrodorus, in his book
On the Source of Happiness in
Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects
, says:
What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh,
and the sure hope of its continuance?
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The text has
ἀρετῶν
,
virtues, for which, in accordance with Pythagoras’
well-known opinion,
ἀριθμῶν
has been substituted from Theodoret.
2410
For
κατάπληξιν
of the text, Heinsius reads
ἀκατάπληξιν
,
which corresponds to the other term ascribed
to Democritus—
ἁθαμβίην
.