Testimonia

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enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are incon- sistent with man’s liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any Necessity which absolute decrees infer. Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God’s Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 474, &c.) he says, “God’s Prescience has no influence at all on our actions.—Should God, says he, by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man’s state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all.—Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more fixture, than they could be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God’s decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end.—Hence God’s Prescience renders no actions necessary.” And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites Origen, where he says, ”God’s Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God’s Prescience that they will be:” and Le Blanc, where he says, ”This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen.“ In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, (p. 95 - 99.) And the Author of The Freedom of the Will, in God and Creature, speaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents ”Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than After-knowledge,” or to that purpose. To all which I would say; that what is said about Knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether Prescience be the thing that makes the event neces- sary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the Necessity. 123 If the Foreknow- 123 This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby’s objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no other necessity but the decretive, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if any thing is foreknown because it is decreed, every thing is foreknown on the same ground, of for the same reason.—And then, this proving too much —the decretive appointment of all the evil in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore impossible—they reject the whole doctrine of necessity as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they cannot clearly disprove what is advanced against 611 SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…

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