CHAP. II.j CHRISTIAN RELIGION. ^53
and if his promising it argues our poverty, let no man 1 esitate
to acknowledge, that he is incapable of understanding the
mysteries of God, any further than he has been illuminated
])y Divine grace. He who attributes to himself more under-
standing, is so much the bliniier, because he does not perceive/I
and acknowledge his blindness^
XXII. Itremains for us To notice the third branch of know-
ledge, relating to the rule for the proper regulation of our life,
which we truly denominate the knowledge of works of rights
eousness ; in which the human mind discovers somewhat
more acuteness than in the two former particulars. For the
Apostle declares, that " when the Gentiles, which have not the
law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having
not the law, are a law unto themselves ; which show the work
of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bear-
ing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else
excusing one another." (z) If the Gentiles have naturally the
righteousness of the law engraven on their minds, we certainly
cannot say that they are altogether ignorant how they ought
to live. And no sentiment is more commonly admitted, than
that man is sufficiently instructed in a right rule of life by that
natural law of which the Apostle there speaks. But let us ex-
amine for what purpose this knowledge of the law was given
to men ; and then it will appear how far it can conduct them
towards the mark of reason and truth. This is evident also
from the words of Paul, if we observe the connection of the
passage. He had just before said, " As many as have sinned
,
without law, shall also perish without law ; and as many as
have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law." Because
it might appear absurd that the Gentiles should perish without
any previous knowledge, he immediately subjoins that their
;
conscience supplies the place of a law to them, and is there-
fore sufficient for their just condemnation. The end of the
law of nature, therefore, is, that man may be rendered inexcu-
sable. Nor will it be improperly defined in this manner— That
it is a sentiment of the conscience sufficiently discerning be-
tween good and evil, to deprive men of the pretext of ignorance,
while they are convicted even by their own testimony. Such
is the indulgence ofman to himself, that in the perpetration of
evil actions he always gladly diverts his mind as much as h6>
possibly can from all sense of sin ; which seems to have in-
duced Plato to suppose, that no sin is committed but through
ignorance. This remark of his would be correct, if the hy
pocrisy of men could go so far iji the concealment of theii
vices, as that the mind would have no consciousness of its guilt
(z) Rom. ii. 14, 15.