To that objection, she replied,
we answer this. The speculative and critical faculty is the property of
the soul’s godlike part; for it is by these that we grasp the
Deity also. If, then whether by forethought here, or by purgation
hereafter, our soul becomes free from any emotional connection with the
brute creation, there will be nothing to impede its contemplation of
the Beautiful; for this last is essentially capable of attracting in a
certain way every being that looks towards it. If, then, the soul is
purified of every vice, it will most certainly be in the sphere of
Beauty. The Deity is in very substance Beautiful; and to the Deity the
soul will in its state of purity have affinity, and will embrace It as
like itself. Whenever this happens, then, there will be no longer need
of the impulse of Desire to lead the way to the Beautiful. Whoever
passes his time in darkness, he it is who will be under the influence
of a desire for the light; but whenever he comes into the light, then
enjoyment takes the place of desire, and the power to enjoy renders
desire useless and out of date. It will therefore be no detriment to
our participation in the Good, that the soul should be free from such
emotions, and turning back upon herself should know herself accurately
what her actual nature is, and should behold the Original Beauty
reflected in the mirror and in the figure of her own beauty. For truly
herein consists the real assimilation to the Divine; viz. in making our
own life in some degree a copy of the Supreme Being. For a Nature like
that, which transcends all thought and is far removed from all that we
observe within ourselves, proceeds in its existence in a very different
manner to what we do in this present life. Man, possessing a
constitution whose law it is to be moving, is carried in that
particular direction whither the impulse of his will directs: and so
his soul is not affected in the same way towards what lies before it κατὰ το
ἔμπροσθεν
αὐτῆς., as one may say, as to what it has left
behind; for hope leads the forward movement, but it is memory that
succeeds that movement when it has advanced to the attainment of the
hope; and if it is to something intrinsically good that hope thus leads
on the soul, the print that this exercise of the will leaves upon the
memory is a bright one; but if hope has seduced the soul with some
phantom only of the Good, and the excellent Way has been missed, then
the memory that succeeds what has happened becomes shame, and an
intestine war is thus waged in the soul between memory and hope,
because the last has been such a bad leader of the will. Such in fact
is the state of mind that shame gives expression to; the soul is stung
as it were at the result; its remorse for its ill-considered attempt is
a whip that makes it feel to the quick, and it would bring in oblivion
to its aid against its tormentor. Now in our case nature, owing to its
being indigent of the Good, is aiming always at this which is still
wanting to it, and this aiming at a still missing thing is this very
habit of Desire, which our constitution displays equally, whether it is
baulked of the real Good, or wins that which it is good to win. But a
nature that surpasses every idea that we can form of the Good and
transcends all other power, being in no want of anything that can be
regarded as good, is itself the plenitude of every good; it does not
move in the sphere of the good by way of participation in it only, but
it is itself the substance of the Good (whatever we imagine the Good to
be); it neither gives scope for any rising hope (for hope manifests
activity in the direction of something absent; but “what a man
has, why doth he yet hope for?” as the Apostle asks), nor is it
in want of the activity of the memory for the knowledge of things; that which is
actually seen has no need of being remembered. Since, then, this Divine
nature is beyond any particular good any particular good, not as Oehler,
“jenseits alles Guten.” The Divine Being is the complement,
not the negation, of each single good., and to the
good the good is an object of love, it follows that when It looks
within Itself ἐν
ἑαυτῇ
βλέπουσα. But Augentius and Sifanus seem to have read ἑαυτὴν: and this
is supported by three Codd., It wishes for what
It contains and contains that which It wishes, and admits nothing
external. Indeed there is nothing external to It, with the sole
exception of evil, which, strange as it may seem to say, possesses an
existence in not existing at all. For there is no other origin of evil
except the negation of the existent, and the truly-existent forms the
substance of the Good. That therefore which is not to be found in the
existent must be in the non-existent. Whenever the soul, then, having
divested itself of the multifarious emotions incident to its nature,
gets its Divine form and, mounting above Desire, enters within that
towards which it was once incited by that Desire, it offers no harbour
within itself either for hope or for memory. It holds the object of the
one; the other is extruded from the consciousness by the occupation in
enjoying all that is good: and thus the soul copies the life that is
above, and is conformed to the peculiar features of the Divine nature;
none of its habits are left to it except that of love, which clings by
natural affinity to the Beautiful. For this is what love is; the
inherent affection towards a chosen object. When, then, the soul,
having become simple and single in form and so perfectly godlike, finds
that perfectly simple and immaterial good which is really worth
enthusiasm and love τὸ μόνον τῷ
ὄντι
ἀγαπητὸν καὶ
ἐράσμιον., it attaches itself
to it and blends with it by means of the movement and activity of love,
fashioning itself according to that which it is continually finding and
grasping. Becoming by this assimilation to the Good all that the nature
of that which it participates is, the soul will consequently, owing to
there being no lack of any good in that thing itself which it
participates, be itself also in no lack of anything, and so will expel
from within the activity and the habit of Desire; for this arises only
when the thing missed is not found. For this teaching we have the
authority of God’s own Apostle, who announces a subduing καταστολὴν. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 8–13. and a ceasing of all other activities, even
for the good, which are within us, and finds no limit for love alone.
Prophecies, he says, shall fail; forms of knowledge shall cease; but
“charity never faileth;” which is equivalent to its being
always as it is: and though Schmidt well remarks that there lies in λέγων here
not a causal but only a concessive force: and he puts a stop
before εἰκότως. Oehler has not seen that ἀγάπῃ is governed by
the preposition σὺν in the verb “by
the side of love,” and quite mistranslates the
passage. he says that faith
and hope have endured so far by the side of love, yet again he prolongs
its date beyond theirs, and with good reason too; for hope is in
operation only so long as the enjoyment of the things hoped for is not
to be had; and faith in the same way is a support ἔρεισμα. in the uncertainty about the things hoped
for; for so he defines it—“the substance ὑπόστασις Heb. xi. 1. of things hoped for”; but when the
thing hoped for actually comes, then all other faculties are reduced to
quiescence reduced to quiescence, ἀτρεμούντων. This is the reading adopted by Krabinger, from four
Codd., instead of the vox nihili of the editions, εὐτηρεμόντων. The contrast must be between “remaining in activity
(ἐνεργεία),” and “becoming idle,” and he quotes a passage
from Plotinus to show that ἀτρεμεῖν has exactly this latter sense. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 8,
10, καταργηθήσονται,
καταργηθήσεται, and love alone remains active,
finding nothing to succeed itself. Love, therefore, is the foremost of
all excellent achievements and the first of the commandments of the
law. If ever, then, the soul reach this goal, it will be in no need of
anything else; it will embrace that plenitude of things which are,
whereby alone whereby alone, καθ᾽ ὃ δοκεῖ
μόνον πως
αὐτῆς, κ. τ. λ, the reading of Sifanus. it seems in any way
to preserve within itself the stamp of God’s actual blessedness.
For the life of the Supreme Being is love, seeing that the Beautiful is
necessarily lovable to those who recognize it, and the Deity does
recognize it, and so this recognition becomes love, that which He
recognizes being essentially beautiful. This True Beauty the insolence
of satiety cannot touch the insolence of satiety cannot touch. Krabinger quotes from two of his Codd. a scholium to this effect:
“Then this proves to be nonsense what Origen has imagined about
the satiety of minds, and their consequent fall and recall, on which he
bases his notorious teaching about the pre-existence and restoration of
souls that are always revolving in endless motion, determined as he is,
like a retailer of evil, to mingle the Grecian myths with the
Church’s truth.” Gregory, more sober in his idealism,
certainly does not follow on this point his great Master. The
phrase ὑβριστὴς
κόρος is used by
Gregory Naz. also in his Poems (p. 32 A), and may have been
suggested to both by some poet, now lost. “Familiarity breeds
contempt” is the modern equivalent.; and no satiety
interrupting this continuous capacity to love the Beautiful,
God’s life will have its activity in love; which life is thus in
itself beautiful, and is essentially of a loving disposition towards
the Beautiful, and receives no check to this activity of love. In fact,
in the Beautiful no limit is to be found so that love should have to
cease with any limit of the Beautiful. This last can be ended only by
its opposite; but when you have a good, as here, which is in its
essence incapable of a change for the worse, then that good will go on
unchecked into infinity. Moreover, as every being is capable of
attracting its like, and humanity is, in a way, like God, as bearing
within itself some resemblances to its Prototype, the soul is by a
strict necessity attracted to the kindred Deity. In fact what belongs
to God must by all means and at any cost be preserved for Him. If, then, on
the one hand, the soul is unencumbered with superfluities and no
trouble connected with the body presses it down, its advance towards
Him Who draws it to Himself is sweet and congenial. But suppose But suppose, &c. Möller
(Gregorii doctrina de hom. natur., p. 99) shows that the
following view of Purgatory is not that taught by the Roman
Church., on the other hand, that it has been
transfixed with the nails of propension by
the nails of propension. This metaphor is
frequently used by Gregory. Cf. De Virginit. c. 5: “How
can the soul which is riveted (προσηλωθεῖσα) to the pleasures of the flesh, and busied with merely
human longings, turn a disengaged eye upon its kindred intellectual
light?” So De Beatitud. Or. viii. (I. p. 833),
&c. so
as to be held down to a habit connected with material things,—a
case like that of those in the ruins caused by earthquakes, whose
bodies are crushed by the mounds of rubbish; and let us imagine by way
of illustration that these are not only pressed down by the weight of
the ruins, but have been pierced as well with some spikes and splinters
discovered with them in the rubbish. What then, would naturally be the
plight of those bodies, when they were being dragged by relatives from
the ruins to receive the holy rites of burial, mangled and torn
entirely, disfigured in the most direful manner conceivable, with the
nails beneath the heap harrowing them by the very violence necessary to
pull them out?—Such I think is the plight of the soul as well
when the Divine force, for God’s very love of man, drags that
which belongs to Him from the ruins of the irrational and material. Not
in hatred or revenge for a wicked life, to my thinking, does God bring
upon sinners those painful dispensations; He is only claiming and
drawing to Himself whatever, to please Him, came into existence. But
while He for a noble end is attracting the soul to Himself, the
Fountain of all Blessedness, it is the occasion necessarily to the
being so attracted of a state of torture. Just as those who refine gold
from the dross which it contains not only get this base alloy to melt
in the fire, but are obliged to melt the pure gold along with the
alloy, and then while this last is being consumed the gold remains, so,
while evil is being consumed in the purgatorial purgatorial, καθαρσί&
251·. Five of Krabinger’s Codd. and
the versions of Augentius and Sifanus approve this reading. That of the
Editions is ἀκοιμήτῳ. [This last epithet is applied to God’s justice
(δικὴ) by Isidore of Pelusium, Ep. 90: and to the
“worm,” and, on the other hand, the Devil, by Cyril
Alexand. Act. Ephes., p. 252. Cf. S. Math. iii. 12; S. Mark ix.
48.]
It is the same with αἰωνί& 251· before πυρὶ just below. The
Editions have it; the Codd. and Latin versions have not: Krabinger
therefore has not hesitated to expunge it.
fire, the soul that is welded to this evil must inevitably be in the
fire too, until the spurious material alloy is consumed and annihilated
by this fire. If a clay of the more tenacious kind is deeply plastered
round a rope, and then the end of the rope is put through a narrow
hole, and then some one on the further side violently pulls it by that
end, the result must be that, while the rope itself obeys the force
exerted, the clay that has been plastered upon it is scraped off it
with this violent pulling and is left outside the hole, and, moreover,
is the cause why the rope does not run easily through the passage, but
has to undergo a violent tension at the hands of the puller. In such a
manner, I think, we may figure to ourselves the agonized struggle of
that soul which has wrapped itself up in earthy material passions, when
God is drawing it, His own one, to Himself, and the foreign matter,
which has somehow grown into its substance, has to be scraped from it
by main force, and so occasions it that keen intolerable
anguish.