CHAP. I.
Showing wherein the essence of true virtue consists.
Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet
all excepting, some sceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice, mean
by it something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty, or excellency. It is not all beauty
that is called virtue; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow;
but some beauty belonging to beings that have perception and will. It is not all beauty of
mankind that is called virtue; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or
shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original
seat in the mind. But yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is
properly called virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation; there is something
in the ideas and conceptions of great philosophers and statesmen, that may be called beau-
tiful; which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue.
But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature,
i.e. such as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise or blame. Things of this sort, it
is generally agreed, so far as I know, do not belong merely to speculation; but to the dispos-
ition and will, or (to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) to the heart.
Therefore, I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue
is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from
them. So that when it is inquired, what is the nature of true virtue? this is the same as to in-
quire, what that is, which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly
beautiful?
I use the phrase true virtue, and speak of things truly beautiful, because I suppose it will
generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are
truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be so, through a partial and imperfect view
of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially and
superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circum-
stances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehens-
ive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature, and the extent of their connex-
ions in the universality of things.
There is a general and particular beauty. By a particular beauty, I mean that by which
a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connexion with, and
tendency to, some particular things within a limited, and as it were a private, sphere. And
a general beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly,
comprehensively, and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connexions with
every thing to which it stands related. The former may be without and against the latter. As
a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may
be harmonious; which, when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire
CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.
864
CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.