first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no
hand in determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines
their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The
case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a suc-
cession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act he not free, being determined
by something out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that
the next, and so on; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are determined
by, some cause out of the Will; and so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the
Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of
ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that
the next; and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its
motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by something else; in this case,
though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain, yet it appears that
14
the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or self-de-
termining power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by
something that did not belong to the chain.—If the Will be not free in the first act, which
causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act; for though
indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which
it was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so neither
can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in like manner, that third was determ-
ined by an act of the Will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from
that to the next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one: if the first on
which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will
is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it de-
termines them all is not a free act; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining
them, than if it did not cause them at all.—Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the
Will, consisting in the will’s Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly
out of the world.
545
SECTION I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of…